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Executive Summary
This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses closure for 
Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 553, Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, identified in the Federal 
Facility Agreement and Consent Order.  Corrective Action Unit 553 consists of four Corrective 
Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 19 and 20 of the Nevada Test Site as follows:
• 19-99-01, Mud Spill
• 19-99-11, Mud Spill
• 20-09-09, Mud Spill
• 20-99-03, Mud Spill
This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for 
closing each CAS.  There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical 
documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of 
potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 553 using the SAFER process. 
The data quality objective process developed for this CAU identified the following expected closure 
options:  (1) investigation and confirmation that no contamination exists above the preliminary action 
levels leading to a no further action declaration, or (2) characterization of the nature and extent of 
contamination leading to closure in place with use restrictions.  The expected closure options were 
selected based on available information including contaminants of potential concern (COPCs), future 
land use, and assumed risks.  A decision flow process was developed to outline the collection of data 
necessary to achieve closure.  There are two decisions that need to be answered for closure.  
Decision I is to determine whether COPCs are present in concentrations exceeding the final action 
levels (FALs).  If COPCs are found to be present above FALs, Decision II will be to determine the 
extent of contamination and generate all other information necessary to complete closure of the site.
The following text summarizes the types of activities that will support the closure of CAU 553:
• Perform site preparation activities (e.g., build hazardous waste accumulation area).
• Remove and dispose of bentonite waste at CAS 20-09-09 as a best management practice. 
UNCONTROLLED when Printed
CAU 553 SAFER Plan
Executive Summary
Revision:  0
Date:  November 2006
Page ES-2 of ES-3
• Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (i.e., mud) to confirm or 
disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) (i.e., nature of contamination) as 
necessary to supplement existing information.
• If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean 
soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of 
COC contamination. 
• Establish no further action as the corrective action if no contaminants are detected above 
FALs.
• If a COC is present at a CAS, and removal is not feasible, establish closure in place as the 
corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions.
• Confirm the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the 
environment. 
• Document all closure activities for CAU 553 in a Closure Report.
Historical information and process knowledge identified sources of potential contamination for the 
mud spills.  See Table ES.1-1 for a summary of the conceptual site model assumptions and expected 
closures.
Under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order, the SAFER Plan will be submitted to the 
Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for approval.  Fieldwork will be conducted 
following approval of the plan.  On completion of the field activities, a Closure Report will be 
prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval.   
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Table ES.1-1
Summary of Conceptual Site Model Assumptions and Expected Closures
Corrective Action 
Site
Potential Release of 
COCs
Conceptual Site Model 
Assumptions
Expected 
Closure
Mud Spills:  19-99-01, 
19-99-11, 20-09-09, and 
20-99-03
Primary source for potential 
radiological contamination 
is a release of drilling mud 
associated with drilling 
activities subsequent to 
underground testing. 
 
Primary source for total 
petroleum hydrocarbons is 
a release of drilling mud in 
which diesel was added as 
a lubricant.  
 
The locations of a release 
are expected to be limited 
to drilling muds.
Contamination at a mud spill is 
expected to be bound within the 
residual mud (i.e., would not migrate 
vertically downward into the underlying 
soil). 
 
Lateral extent of contamination is 
expected to be limited to the extent of 
the drilling mud spill.   
 
Based on results from previous 
investigations, no COCs are 
anticipated.  Note:  Verification 
samples will be collected and analyzed 
for a limited suite of analytes to confirm 
the absence of COCs.
No further action 
with a contingency 
for closure in place 
with use restriction
COC = Contaminant of concern
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1.0 Introduction
This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions 
necessary for the closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 553:  Areas 19, 20 Mud Pits and Cellars, 
Nevada Test Site (NTS), Nevada.  It has been developed in accordance with the Federal Facility 
Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada, the 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the U.S. Department of Defense. 
A SAFER may be performed when the following criteria are met:
• Conceptual corrective actions are clearly identified (although some degree of investigation 
may be necessary to select a specific corrective action before completion of the Corrective 
Action Investigation [CAI])
• Uncertainty of the nature, extent, and corrective action must be limited to an acceptable level 
of risk
• The SAFER Plan includes decision points and criteria for making data quality objective 
(DQO) decisions
The purpose of the investigation will be to document and verify the adequacy of existing information; 
to affirm the decision for clean closure, closure in place, or no further action; and to provide sufficient 
data to implement the corrective action.  The actual corrective action selected will be based on 
characterization activities implemented under this SAFER Plan.  This SAFER Plan identifies decision 
points developed in cooperation with the Nevada Department of Environmental Protection (NDEP), 
where the DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) will 
reach consensus with the NDEP before beginning the next phase of work.
Corrective Action Unit 553 is located in Areas 19 and 20 of the NTS, approximately 65 miles (mi) 
northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada (Figure 1-1).  Corrective Action Unit 553 is comprised of the four 
Corrective Action Sites (CASs) shown on Figure 1-1 and listed below:  
• 19-99-01, Mud Spill
• 19-99-11, Mud Spill
• 20-09-09, Mud Spill
• 20-99-03, Mud Spill
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Figure 1-1
Nevada Test Site Map with CAU 553 CAS Locations
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There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and 
investigations of similar sites (i.e., the expected nature and extent of contaminants of potential 
concern [COPCs]) to recommend closure of CAU 553 using the SAFER process (FFACO, 1996).
1.1 SAFER Process Description
Corrective action units that may be closed using the SAFER process have conceptual corrective 
actions that are clearly identified.  Consequently, corrective action alternatives can be chosen before 
completing a CAI, given anticipated investigation results.
The SAFER process combines elements of the DQO process and the observational approach to plan 
and conduct closure activities.  The DQOs are used to identify the problem and define the type and 
quality of data needed to complete closure of each CAS.  The purpose of the investigation phase is to 
verify the adequacy of existing information used to determine the chosen corrective action and to 
confirm that closure objectives were met.
Use of the SAFER process allows for technical decisions to be made based on incomplete but 
sufficient information, and the experience of the decision-maker.  Based on a detailed review of 
historical documentation, there is sufficient process knowledge to close CAU 553 using the SAFER 
process.  Any uncertainties are addressed by documented assumptions that are verified by sampling 
and analysis, data evaluation, and on-site observations, as necessary.  Closure activities may proceed 
simultaneously with site characterization as sufficient data are gathered to confirm or disprove the 
assumptions made during selection of the corrective action.  If at any time during the closure process, 
new information is discovered that indicates that closure activities should be revised, closure 
activities will be re-evaluated as appropriate.
1.2 Summary of Corrective Actions and Closures
The decision process for closure of CAU 553 is summarized in Figure 1-2.  This process starts with 
the initial investigation in which the appropriate target population(s) within each CAS (defined in the 
DQO process, Appendix B) is sampled.  If contaminants are detected at concentrations that are above 
the final action levels (FALs) and remediation is feasible, the nature and extent of contamination will 
be delineated by additional sampling.  However, contingencies are built into the process in the event     
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Figure 1-2
CAU 553 Closure Decision Process
Conduct biased sample collection and analyze
for COPCs in target population
Does any
COC remain in the
environmental
media?
Is additional
remediation feasible?
Do conditions at CAS 
violate SAFER conditions?
Remove additional
contaminated media
No further action required Determine extent of COCs
Close in place with
appropriate use restrictions
Yes Yes
Yes
No No
No
- Stop -
Reach consensus on path
forward with NDEP prior to
continued evaluation of
CAS
Prepare Closure Report
SAFER Decision Flow Logic Diagram
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new information is identified that indicates that the selected closure option should be revised.  The 
process ends with closure of the site based on laboratory analytical results of the environmental 
samples and the preparation of a Closure Report.  Corrective action alternatives of closure in place 
and clean closure will be evaluated for each CAS with contaminants above FALs.
Decision points that require a consensus be reached between the NNSA/NSO and NDEP before 
continuing are indicated in Figure 1-2.
In addition to the previously discussed hold/decision points, work may be temporarily suspended 
until the issue can be satisfactorily resolved, if any of the following unexpected conditions occur:
• Conditions outside the scope of work are encountered. 
• Radiological screening yields results that require an upgrade in procedures to continue survey 
work in specific areas.
• Elevated levels of additional contaminants of concern (COCs) are found that were not 
originally identified as being present at the sites.
• Unexpected conditions including unexpected waste and/or contamination are encountered.
• Out-of-scope work activities are required due to the detection of other COCs, that would 
require re-evaluating a disposal pathway, such as with hazardous or low-level waste.
• Unsafe conditions or work practices.
The CASs in CAU 553 are anticipated to be closed with the designation no further action based on the 
application of process knowledge and previous site investigation results from similar CASs in 
CAUs 530-535 and CAU 177.  Applying process knowledge and the assumptions and results from 
previous mud pit investigations is expected to result in there being no required activity at these CASs.  
A contingency is in place for individual mud spills to be closed in place with implementation of use 
restrictions if a COC is present and there is sufficient information to establish the boundaries of 
contamination. 
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Assumptions relating mud spills to the processes involved with NTS mud pits that serve as the basis 
for this investigation are:
• Mud spills in CAU 553 are considered to have resulted from essentially the same process as 
mud pits.  A mud spill is an incidental release of drilling mud that was once contained (e.g., in 
a truck or tank), whereas a mud pit is a structure excavated into the ground to facilitate mud 
circulation during borehole drilling.  This assumes the mud within the spill areas may have 
been used in the drilling process; however, the spills are not contained within a bermed mud 
pit. 
• Any drilling fluid present in the mud was homogenized during the mixing or drilling 
operations. 
• Due to the physical properties of the affected media (mud), contamination, if present, is 
expected to be bound within the matrix of the residual mud with no significant lateral or 
vertical migration.
• Verification sampling will be adequate to support the absence of chemical and radiological 
COPCs (including total petroleum hydrocarbons [TPH]-diesel-range organics [DRO]).  
Results of previous mud pit investigations support the elimination of chemical constituents as 
COPCs.  Because the mud spills are not posted as radioactive material areas (RMAs), and 
recent walkover survey results indicate no elevated radioactivity, radionuclides are not 
expected to be present. 
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2.0 Unit Description
The operational history, process knowledge, and existing information for each CAS are summarized 
in this section.  Each CAS is the direct release of drilling mud potentially impacted by TPH-DRO and 
radiological contamination.  Process knowledge for the CASs in CAU 553 has been obtained through 
historical document reviews, engineering drawing and map reviews, and interviews with past and 
present NTS employees.  Some uncertainty remains regarding specific knowledge of past operations 
for this CAU.  Site-specific historical documentation pertaining to each CAS is also limited; however, 
it is assumed that the mud spills are associated with drilling activities at the NTS.  Based on the 
process knowledge and information about the CASs and using the Mud Pit Risk-Based Closure 
Strategy Report (RBCSR) (NNSA/NSO, 2004a), assumptions were made to formulate a conceptual 
site model (CSM) that describes the most probable scenario for the current conditions at each CAS.  
Section 3.2.5 provides additional information on the CSM developed for the CASs in CAU 553.
2.1 General Description
This section provides a description of information relating the mud pit process to the mud spills in 
each CAS. 
2.1.1 Mud Pit Process and Contaminant Release
The mud spills of CAU 553 are assumed to have similar releases as those identified for the NTS mud 
pits in CAUs 530-535 and CAU 177.  It is unknown whether the spills occurred before or after use in 
the drilling process where diesel and/or radioactivity may have been released.  It can also be 
reasonably assumed the spill material composition is similar (i.e., mud/clay composition and 
properties) regardless if the release was associated with pre- or post-test drilling activities. 
Although the RBCSR eliminated volatile organic compounds (VOCs), semivolatile organic 
compounds (SVOCs), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and metals as COPCs from NTS mud pits 
(based on the conclusion that there is no analytical or process knowledge to suggest these constituents 
are present at significant concentrations in residual mud), TPH was the most frequently detected 
contaminant in residual mud.  To be conservative, it was determined that the investigation of 
CAU 553 would evaluate the risk posed by TPH-DRO and verify the closure strategy of no further 
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action for CAU 553 mud pits.  Because complete information regarding activities performed at the 
CAU 553 mud spills is not available, VOCs, SVOCs, and radiological constituents will also be 
included as COPCs.
The process associated with potential contamination at a mud pit is assumed to be the same process 
that may have contributed to contamination at a mud spill.  Section B.3.2.1 addresses the release of 
contaminants associated with the drilling mud in more detail. 
2.2 CAS 19-99-01, Mud Spill
2.2.1 Description and Location
Corrective Action Site 19-99-01 consists of the environmental release associated with a mud spill 
located on and surrounding a dirt mound located in Area 19 adjacent to the north side of the fenced 
U-19ad potential crater area east of Pahute Mesa Road.  The release may contain TPH and potentially 
radioactive constituents based on process knowledge of mud pits and drilling processes.
The mud spill is located on top of a dirt mound and the spill extends downslope in several directions 
with a small portion extending past the U-19ad fenceline.  The dirt mound is approximately 8 feet (ft) 
high and covers an area of approximately 1,250 square feet (ft2).  Scattered vegetation is growing on 
and around the dirt mound and within the mud.  Several pieces of debris are visible within the area, 
and the presence of a dirt mound suggests that the ground surface has been disturbed.  Surface soil, 
including the mound, consists of light-brown to pinkish-brown, silt to sand size volcanic material.  
Figure 2-1 shows the CAS boundaries and physical layout.    
2.2.2 History and Process Knowledge
The area was used for conducting an underground weapons-related test at U-19ad.  The Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (LANL) Chancellor test was conducted on September 1, 1983, as a part of 
Operational Phalanx (DOE/NV, 2000).  Based on proximity, CAS 19-99-01 mud spill is believed to 
be associated with pre- and/or post-test drilling activities at U-19ad; however, several other tests were 
conducted in the vicinity of the mud spill and drilling activities at these tests may have contributed to 
the release of drilling mud.  Therefore, the mud spill release is assumed to be similar in operation and 
composition to NTS mud pit material (DOE/NV, 2001). 
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Figure 2-1
Corrective Action Site 19-99-01, Mud Spill
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2.2.3 Available Characterization Information
Geophysical surveys were conducted in 2002 (Shaw) and 2006 (Fahringer) and identified one 
anomaly to the west of the mound, most likely due to corrugated metal casing partially visible at the 
surface.  No other buried metal was detected below the soil mound.  A radiological survey conducted 
at the site identified elevated gamma readings in the southeast corner of the site; however, based on 
these surveys, it was determined that the radiological readings are below two times background 
(Alderson, 2002).  No soil analytical results were identified for this CAS. 
2.3 CAS 19-99-11, Mud Spill 
2.3.1 Description and Location
Corrective Action Site 19-99-11 consists of the environmental releases associated with three mud 
spills located approximately 50 ft east of the fenced U-19q/U-19q PS#1D potential crater area 
(REECo, 1991).  The releases may contain TPH and potentially radioactive constituents based on 
process knowledge of mud pits and drilling processes.  
The CAS is located in Area 19 west of the Pahute Mesa Road near the U-19q potential crater area.   
The three separate mud spills are referred to as the south, north, and west spills and have a total area 
of approximately 1,167 ft2.  The south mud spill is the smallest and measures approximately 216 ft2 
and consists of a thin, weathered layer of brown-gray powdery mud that overlies a cracked, harder 
layer of darker gray mud.  The west spill is approximately 458 ft2 and consists of a 1-ft-thick layer of 
crumbled gray mud overlying a 3-ft mound of native soil.  The north spill is approximately 493 ft2 
and appears to consist of gray grout aggregate with areas of yellow staining.  Black wire and wood 
fencing debris are visible on the surface.  Figure 2-2 shows the CAS boundaries and the physical 
layout.     
2.3.2 History and Process Knowledge
The area was used for conducting an underground weapons-related test at U-19q.  The Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Camembert test was conducted on June 26, 1975, as a part of 
Operation Bedrock (DOE/NV, 2000).  Based on proximity, CAS 19-99-11 mud spill is believed to be 
associated with post-test drilling activities at drill hole U-19q PS#1D.  Therefore, the mud spill 
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Figure 2-2
Corrective Action Site 19-99-11, Mud Spill
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release is assumed to be operationally and compositionally similar to NTS mud pit material 
(DOE/NV, 2001). 
2.3.3 Available Characterization Information
No site-specific geophysical or radiological surveys or analytical results were identified for this CAS. 
2.4 CAS 20-09-09, Mud Spill 
2.4.1 Description and Location
Corrective Action Site 20-09-09 consists of the environmental release associated with two bentonite 
mud spills located approximately 20 ft south of mud mixing plants at the Area 20 Pahute Mesa Mud 
Plant (REECo, 1992).
The site is located in the Pahute Mesa Mud Plant at Rad-Safe Marker (RSM) 20 P 114 in Area 20 
and consists of two dry substance spills of dry, cracked gray bentonite on the ground surface.  
The dimensions of the each spill are approximately 3 by 12 ft and 2 to 12 inches (in.) thick.  
The dimensions are easily visible compared to the graded pad/road surface.  The soil within and 
around the site appears to be native volcanic rock.  Figure 2-3 shows the CAS boundaries and the 
physical layout. 
2.4.2 History and Process Knowledge
The site is the location of the inactive Pahute Mesa Mud Plant at which mud mixing and water 
distribution operations for drilling activities in Pahute Mesa were conducted (Geary, 1965).  Mud was 
generated at the plant for use in Area 20 drilling activities.  Drilling mud is typically a combination of 
powdered bentonite clay mixed with water to form a viscous fluid (REECo, 1994).  The dry substance 
spill is believed to have resulted from these mud mixing activities and not used in actual drilling 
processes.  Currently, the site is marked as a DOE Operational Readiness Area.  
2.4.3 Available Characterization Information
No site-specific geophysical or radiological surveys or analytical results were identified for this CAS. 
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Figure 2-3
Corrective Action Site 20-09-09, Mud Spill
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2.5 CAS 20-99-03, Mud Spill 
2.5.1 Description and Location
Corrective Action Site 20-99-03 consists of a potential environmental release associated with the mud 
spill located southeast of the fenced U-20aq crater area (REECo, 1991).  The release may contain 
TPH and potentially radioactive constituents based on process knowledge of mud pits and drilling 
processes.
The mud spill is located in Area 20 south of the U-20aq crater area and consists of one continuous 
area of dried mud on the ground surface.  The spill area measures approximately 750 by 300 ft and is 
light pinkish-brown clay/silty material, dry, and cracked.  The thickness varies between 1 to 6 in. 
thick.  A pile of small steel pellets (based on visual observations of rust) is located on the northeast 
side of the spill but does not represent a health hazard.  The dimensions of the mud spill are easily 
visible against the native black/red volcanic surface and an active dirt road dissects the spill in half.   
Figure 2-4 shows the CAS boundaries and the physical layout.  
2.5.2 History and Process Knowledge
The area was used for conducting the underground Darwin test by LLNL and the United Kingdom on 
June 25, 1986, in U-20aq (DOE/NV, 2000; RSN, 1991).  Based on proximity to U-20aq, 
CAS 20-99-03 mud spill is believed to be associated with post-test drilling activities at U-20aq.  
There is a potential that mud may have been drained in this area from metal piping used in drilling 
operations to direct the drilling fluids/cuttings from the drill hole to the mud pit.  Another possibility 
is that a holding tank containing drill mud may have spilled in the area.  Therefore, the mud spill 
release is assumed to be similar in operation and composition to NTS mud pit material 
(DOE/NV, 2001). 
2.5.3 Available Characterization Information
No geophysical survey or analytical results were identified for this CAS.  A radiological survey was 
conducted in 2006, and based on these surveys, it was determined that the radiological readings are 
below two times background (SNJV, 2006).  
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Figure 2-4
Corrective Action Site 20-99-03, Mud Spill
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3.0 Data Quality Objectives
3.1 Summary of DQO Analysis
This section contains a summary of the DQO process presented in Appendix B.  The DQO process is 
a strategic planning approach based on the scientific method that is designed to ensure that the data 
collected will provide sufficient and reliable information to identify, evaluate, and technically defend 
the recommendation of viable corrective actions (e.g., no further action, clean closure, or closure in 
place).
The DQO strategy for CAU 553 was developed at a meeting on July 27, 2006.  The DQOs were 
developed to identify data needs, clearly define the intended use of the environmental data, and to 
design a data collection program that will satisfy these purposes.  During the DQO discussions for 
this CAU, the informational inputs or data needs to resolve problem statements and decision 
statements were documented.
The problem statement for CAU 553 is: “Sufficient historical and analytical information is available 
to support a No Further Action closure alternative for all CASs in CAU 553; however, verification 
samples are required to confirm the absence of COCs at levels that could pose a risk to human health 
or the environment.”  To address this question, the resolution of two decisions statements is required:
• Decision I:  “Is any COPC present in environmental media within a mud spill at a 
concentration exceeding its corresponding action level?”  No further action will be supported 
if no COPCs are identified above corresponding action levels.  For the judgmental sampling 
design, any analytical result for a COPC above the FAL will result in that COPC being 
designated as a COC.  If a COC is detected and remediation is feasible, then contaminated 
media may be removed for disposal and additional samples collected (refer to Figure 1-2).  
If a COC is detected and remediation is not feasible, then Decision II must be resolved.
• Decision II:  “If a COC is present, is sufficient information available to meet closure 
objectives?”  Sufficient information is defined to include:
- Identifying the volume of media containing COCs, as bounded by analytical results in 
lateral and vertical directions
- Information needed to characterize investigation-derived waste (IDW) for disposal
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- Information needed to determine remediation waste types
- Information needed to evaluate the feasibility of potential closure options
The presence of a COC would require a corrective action.  A corrective action may also be necessary 
if there is a potential for wastes that are present at a site to release COCs into site environmental 
media.  To evaluate the potential for site wastes to result in the introduction of a COC to the 
surrounding environmental media, the following conservative assumptions were made:
• Any containment of the wastes would fail at some point and the wastes would be released to 
the surrounding media.
• The resulting concentration of contaminants in the surrounding media would be equal to the 
concentration of contaminants in the waste.
• Any liquid waste contaminant concentrations exceeding the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) toxicity characteristic leaching potential would result in COCs in the 
surrounding media.
Waste solids containing a contaminant exceeding an equivalent FAL concentration would be 
considered to be potential source material and would require a corrective action.  Waste liquids with 
contaminant concentrations exceeding an equivalent toxicity characteristic leaching potential action 
level would be considered to be potential source material and would require a corrective action.
Decision I verification samples will be submitted to analytical laboratories for the analyses listed in 
Table 3-1.  The constituents reported for each analytical method are listed in Table 3-2.        
The list of COPCs is intended to encompass all of the contaminants that could potentially be present 
at each CAS.  These COPCs were identified during the planning process through the review of site 
history, process knowledge, personal interviews, past investigation efforts (where available), and 
inferred activities associated with the CASs.  Contaminants detected at other similar or other NTS 
sites were also included in the COPC list to reduce the uncertainty about potential contamination at 
the CASs because complete information regarding activities performed at the CAU 553 sites is not 
available.
During the review of site history, process knowledge information, personal interviews, past 
investigation efforts, and inferred activities associated with the CASs, none of the COPCs were 
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identified as targeted contaminants at specific CASs.  Targeted contaminants are those COPCs for 
which evidence in the available site and process information suggests that they may be reasonably 
suspected to be present at a given CAS.  The targeted contaminants are required to meet a more 
stringent completeness criteria than other COPCs, thus providing greater protection against a decision 
error (see Appendix B).  There are no targeted contaminants for CAU 553 CAS.
Decision II samples, if collected, will be submitted for the analysis of all unbounded COCs.  In 
addition, samples will be submitted for analyses as needed to support waste management or health 
and safety decisions.  
The data quality indicators (DQIs) of precision, accuracy, representativeness, completeness, 
comparability, and sensitivity needed to satisfy DQO requirements are discussed in Section 7.2.  
Laboratory data will be assessed in the Closure Report to confirm or refute the CSM and determine 
whether the DQO data needs were met.
Table 3-1
Analytical Programa
Analysesb
19
-9
9-
01
19
-9
9-
11
20
-0
9-
09
20
-9
9-
01
Organic COPCs
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons (Diesel-Range Organics) X X X X
Semivolatile Organic Compoundsc X X X X
Volatile Organic Compoundsc X X X X
Radionuclide COPCs
Gamma Spectroscopy X X X X
Isotopic Uranium X X X X
Isotopic Plutonium X X X X
Strontium-90 X X X X
aThe contaminants of potential concern are the analytes reported from the analytical methods listed in 
Table 3-2.
bIf the volume of material is limited, prioritization of the analyses will be necessary.
cMay also include Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure analytes if sample is collected for waste 
management purposes.
COPC = Contaminant of potential concern
X = Required analytical method
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Table 3-2
Analytes Reported by Analytical Methods
VOC SVOC TPH Radionuclides
1,1,1-Trichloroethane 
1,1,1,2-Tetrachloroethane 
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane 
1,1,2-Trichloroethane 
1,1-Dichloroethane 
1,1-Dichloroethene 
cis-1,2-Dichloroethene 
1,2-Dichloroethane 
1,2-Dichloropropane
1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene 
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene 
1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane 
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene 
1,4-Dioxane 
2-Butanone 
2-Chlorotoluene 
2-Hexanone 
4-Methyl-2-pentanone 
Acetone 
Acetonitrile 
Allyl chloride 
Benzene 
Bromodichloromethane 
Bromoform 
Bromomethane 
Carbon disulfide 
Carbon tetrachloride 
Chlorobenzene 
Chloroethane 
Chloroform 
Chloromethane 
Chloroprene 
Dibromochloromethane 
Dichlorodifluoromethane 
Ethyl methacrylate 
Ethylbenzene 
Isobutyl alcohol 
Isopropylbenzene 
m-Dichlorobenzene (1,3) 
Methacrylonitrile 
Methyl methacrylate
Methylene chloride 
N-Butylbenzene 
N-Propylbenzene 
o-Dichlorobenzene (1,2) 
p-Dichlorobenzene (1,4) 
p-isopropyltoluene 
sec-Butylbenzene 
Styrene 
tert-Butylbenzene 
Tetrachloroethene 
Toluene 
Total Xylenes 
Trichloroethene 
Trichlorofluoromethane 
Vinyl acetate 
Vinyl chloride
2,3,4,6-Tetrachlorophenol 
2,4-Dimethylphenol 
2,4-Dinitrotoluene 
2,4,5-Trichlorophenol 
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol 
2-Chlorophenol 
2-Methylnaphthalene 
2-Methylphenol 
2-Nitrophenol 
3-Methylphenolb 
4-Chloroaniline 
4-Methylphenolb 
4-Nitrophenol 
Acenaphthene 
Acenaphthylene 
Aniline 
Anthracene 
Benzo(a)anthracene 
Benzo(a)pyrene 
Benzo(b)fluoranthene 
Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 
Benzo(k)fluoranthene 
Benzoic Acid 
Benzyl Alcohol 
Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate 
Butyl benzyl phthalate 
Carbazole 
Chrysene 
Dibenzo(a,h)anthracene 
Dibenzofuran 
Diethyl Phthalate 
Dimethyl Phthalate 
Di-n-butyl Phthalate 
Di-n-octyl Phthalate 
Fluoranthene 
Fluorene 
Hexachlorobenzene 
Hexachlorobutadienea 
Hexachloroethane 
Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 
Naphthalenea 
Nitrobenzene 
N-Nitroso-di-n-propylamine 
Pentachlorophenol 
Phenanthrene 
Phenol 
Pyrene 
Pyridine
TPH 
(Diesel-Range 
Organics
Plutonium-238 
Plutonium-239/240 
Strontium-90 
Uranium-234 
Uranium-235 
Uranium-238 
 
Other parameters: 
 
Gamma-emitting 
radionuclides
including: 
 
Actinium-228
Americium-241
Cesium-137
Cobalt-60
Europium-152
Europium-154
Europium-155
Lead-212 
Lead-214
Niobium-94
Potassium-40
Thallium-208
Thorium-234
Uranium-235
aMay be reported with VOCs
bMay be reported as 3,4-methylpenol
SVOC = Semivolatile organic compound
TPH = Total petroleum hydrocarbons
VOC = Volatile organic compound
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To satisfy the DQI of sensitivity (Section 7.2.6), the analytical methods must be sufficient to detect 
contamination that is present in the samples at concentrations equal to the corresponding FALs.  
Analytical methods and minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for each CAU 553 COPC are 
provided in Tables 7-2 and 7-3.  The MDC is the lowest concentration of a chemical or radionuclide 
parameter that can be detected in a sample within an acceptable level of error.  Due to changes in 
analytical methodology and changes in analytical laboratory contracts, information in Tables 7-2 and 
7-3 that varies from corresponding information in the Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) will 
supersede that information in the Industrial Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002a). 
3.2 Results of the DQO Analysis
3.2.1 Action Level Determination and Basis
The preliminary action levels (PALs) presented in this section are to be used for site screening 
purposes.  They are not necessarily intended to be used as cleanup action levels or FALs.  However, 
they are useful in screening out contaminants that are not present in sufficient concentrations to 
warrant further evaluation, therefore streamlining the consideration of remedial alternatives.  The 
risk-based corrective action (RBCA) process used to establish FALs is described in the Industrial 
Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006b).  This process conforms with 
Nevada Administrative Code (NAC) Section 445A.227, which lists the requirements for sites with 
soil contamination (NAC, 2005).  For the evaluation of corrective actions, NAC Section 445A.22705 
recommends the use of ASTM Method E 1739-95 to “conduct an evaluation of the site, based on the 
risk it poses to public health and the environment, to determine the necessary remediation standards 
(i.e., FALs) or to establish that corrective action is not necessary” (ASTM, 1995).
This RBCA process, summarized in Figure 3-1, defines three tiers (or levels) of evaluation involving 
increasingly sophisticated analyses:       
• Tier 1 - Sample results from source areas (highest concentrations) are compared to action 
levels based on generic (non-site-specific) conditions (i.e., the PALs established in the 
SAFER.  The FALs may then be established as the Tier 1 action levels or the FALs may be 
calculated using a Tier 2 evaluation.
• Tier 2 - Conducted by calculating Tier 2 site-specific target levels (SSTLs) using site-specific 
information as inputs to the same or similar methodology used to calculate Tier 1 action 
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Figure 3-1
Risk-Based Corrective Action Decision Process
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levels.  The Tier 2 SSTLs are then compared to individual sample results from reasonable 
points of exposure (as opposed to the source areas as is done in Tier 1) on a point by point 
basis.  Total TPH concentrations will not be used for risk-based decisions under Tier 2 or 
Tier 3.  Rather, the individual chemicals of concern will be compared to the SSTLs.
• Tier 3 - Conducted by calculating Tier 3 SSTLs on the basis of more sophisticated risk 
analyses using methodologies described in Method E1739-95 that consider site-, pathway-, 
and receptor-specific parameters. 
Evaluation of DQO decisions will be based on conditions at the site following completion of any 
corrective actions.  Any corrective actions conducted will be reported in the Closure Report.  The 
FALs (along with the basis for their selection) will be defined in the Closure Report, where they will 
be compared to laboratory results in the evaluation of site closure.
3.2.1.1 Chemical PALs
Except as noted herein, the chemical PALs are defined as the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) Region 9 Risk-Based Preliminary Remediation Goals (PRGs) for chemical contaminants in 
industrial soils (EPA, 2004).  For detected chemical COPCs without established PRGs, the protocol 
used by the EPA Region 9 in establishing PRGs (or similar) will be used to establish PALs.  If used, 
this process will be documented in the Closure Report.
3.2.1.2 Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon PALs
The PAL for TPH is 100 parts per million (ppm) as listed in NAC 445A.2272 (NAC, 2005). 
3.2.1.3 Radionuclide PALs
The PALs for radiological contaminants are based on the National Council on Radiation Protection 
and Measurement (NCRP) Report No. 129 recommended screening limits for construction, 
commercial, industrial land-use scenarios (NCRP, 1999) using a 25 millirem per year (mrem/yr) dose 
constraint (Murphy, 2004) and the generic guidelines for residual concentration of radionuclides in 
DOE Order 5400.5 (DOE, 1993).  These PALs are based on the construction, commercial, and 
industrial land-use scenario provided in the guidance, and are appropriate for the NTS, based on 
future land uses presented in Section B.3.2.5.
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Solid media such as concrete and/or structures may pose a potential radiological exposure risk to site 
workers if contaminated.  The radiological PAL for solid media will be defined as the 
unrestricted-release criteria defined in the NV/YMP Radiological Control (RadCon) Manual 
(NNSA/NSO, 2004b).
3.2.2 Hypothesis Test
The baseline condition (i.e., null hypothesis) and alternative condition are:
• Baseline condition - A COC is present
• Alternative condition - A COC is not present
The baseline condition (i.e., null hypothesis) and alternative condition for Decision II are as follows:
• Baseline condition - The extent of a COC has not been defined.
• Alternative condition - The extent of a COC has been defined.
3.2.3 Statistical Model
A judgmental sampling design will be implemented to select sample locations and evaluate DQO 
decisions for all mud spills within the CAU 553 CASs.  The sampling design will assume that the data 
are not normally distributed and that the statistical test will be to compare results to a fixed threshold 
(FALs).  
3.2.4 Design Description/Option
3.2.4.1 Judgmental Sampling
Because individual sample results rather than an average concentration will be used to compare to 
FALs at the CASs undergoing judgmental sampling, statistical methods to generate site 
characteristics will not be used.  Adequate representativeness of the entire target population may not 
be a requirement to developing a sampling design.  If good prior information is available on the target 
site of interest, then the sampling may be designed to collect samples only from areas known to have 
the highest concentration levels on the target site.  If the observed concentrations from these samples 
are below the action level, then a decision can be made that the site contains safe levels of the 
contaminant without the samples being truly representative of the entire area (EPA, 2006).
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All sample locations will be selected to satisfy the DQI of representativeness in that samples collected 
from selected locations will best represent the populations of interest as defined in Section B.6.1.  To 
meet this criterion for judgmental sampling sites, a biased sampling strategy will be used for 
Decision I samples to target areas with the highest potential for contamination, if it is present in the 
CAS.  Sample locations will be determined based on process knowledge, previously acquired data, or 
the field-screening and biasing factors listed in Section B.5.2.1.  If biasing factors are present in soils 
below locations where Decision I samples were removed, additional Decision I soil samples may be 
collected at depth intervals selected by the Site Supervisor (SS) based on biasing factors to a depth 
where they are no longer present.  The SS has the discretion to modify the judgmental sample 
locations, but only if the modified locations meet the decision needs and criteria stipulated in this 
DQO.
3.2.5 Conceptual Site Model and Drawing
The CSM describes the most probable scenario for current conditions at each site and defines the 
assumptions that are the basis for identifying the future land use, contaminant sources, release 
mechanisms, migration pathways, exposure points, and exposure routes.  The CSM is also used to 
support appropriate sampling strategies and data collection methods.  A single CSM has been 
developed for CAU 553 using information from the physical setting, potential contaminant sources, 
release information, historical background information, knowledge from similar sites, and physical 
and chemical properties of the potentially affected media and COPCs.  Figure 3-2 depicts a 
tabular representation of the conceptual pathways to receptors from CAU 553 sources.  Figure 3-3 
depicts a graphical representation of the CSM.  If evidence of contamination that is not consistent 
with the presented CSM is identified during investigation activities, the situation will be reviewed, 
the CSM revised, DQOs re-assessed, and a recommendation made as to how best to proceed.  In such 
cases, participants in the DQO process will be notified and given the opportunity to comment on 
and/or concur with the recommendation.  A detailed discussion of the elements of the CSM is 
presented in Appendix B.      
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Figure 3-2
Conceptual Site Model Flow Chart for CAU 553
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Figure 3-3
Conceptual Site Model Diagram for CAU 553
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4.0 Field Activities and Closure Objectives
This section of the SAFER Plan provides a description of the field activities and closure objectives 
for CAU 553.  The objectives for the field activities are to determine whether COCs exist.  If 
remediation is determined to be feasible, then the extent of COCs will be determined so that a closure 
alternative may be implemented.  All sampling activities will be conducted in compliance with the 
Industrial Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002b) and other applicable, approved procedures and 
instructions.
4.1 Contaminants of Potential Concern
The COPCs applicable to Decision I environmental samples from each mud spill of CAU 553 are 
defined as the analytes reported from the analyses identified in Table 3-1.  The constituents reported 
for each analyses are listed in Tables 3-2 and B.5-1.  The list of COPCs is intended to encompass all 
of the contaminants that could potentially be present at each CAS.  These COPCs were identified 
during the planning process through the review of site history, process knowledge, past investigation 
efforts (where available), and inferred activities associated with the CASs.  Contaminants detected at 
other similar NTS mud pit/spill sites were also included in the COPC list to reduce the uncertainty 
about potential contamination at the CASs because complete information regarding activities 
performed at the CAU 553 sites is not available.  A detailed discussion of the selection of COPCs is 
presented in Appendix B. 
Target analytes are those contaminants for which evidence and available site and process information 
suggests that they may be reasonably suspected to be present at a given CAS.  The targeted 
contaminants are required to meet a more stringent completeness criteria than other COPCs, thus 
providing greater protection against a decision error.  For this investigation, no targeted analytes have 
been identified.
4.2 Remediation
The DQOs developed for CAU 553 identified data gaps that require additional data collection before 
identifying and implementing the preferred closure alternative for each CAS.  A decision point 
approach, based on the DQOs, for making remediation decisions is summarized in Figure 1-2.  The 
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presence of contamination, if any, is assumed to be confined to the spatial boundaries of the sites as 
defined in the DQO process and CSM.  According to DQO guidelines (Appendix B), judgmental 
sampling will be conducted at all CASs.  As a best management practice, the bentonite grout/mud as 
CAS 20-09-09 will be removed and disposed as waste because it is located within a potential work 
area.
If COCs are identified within a CAS based on the initial investigation results, that CAS will be further 
assessed before implementing closure activities.  If COPCs are not present at concentrations 
exceeding FALs, the CAS will be recommended for no further action.  The objective of the initial 
investigation strategy is to determine whether COCs are present.  Laboratory analytical results will be 
used to confirm the presence or absence of COCs. 
If COCs are present, or it is decided that COCs may be present based on the presence of biasing 
factors, a corrective action of removal for disposal may be implemented and additional verification 
samples taken from biased locations within the excavation.  Alternatively, the CAS will be 
recommended for closure in place with administrative controls. 
If a COC is present and removal of the COC is not feasible, information on the extent of COC 
contamination will be obtained by collecting step-out (Decision II) samples.  Decision II sampling 
will consist of further defining the extent of contamination where COCs have been confirmed.  
Step-out (Decision II) sampling locations at each CAS will be selected based on the CSM, biasing 
factors, field-screening results (FSRs), existing data, and the outer boundary sample locations where 
COCs were detected.  In general, step-out sample locations will be arranged in a triangular pattern 
around areas containing a COC at distances based on site conditions, COC concentrations, process 
knowledge, and other biasing factors.  If COCs extend beyond step-out locations, additional Decision 
II samples will be collected from locations further from the source.  If a spatial boundary is reached, 
the CSM is shown to be inadequate, or the SS determines that extent sampling needs to be 
re-evaluated, work will be temporarily suspended, NDEP will be notified, and the investigation 
strategy re-evaluated.  
The judgmental sampling strategy is presented in Appendix B.  Pre-determined biased sample 
locations may be justified by the SS, based on the criteria for satisfying DQO data needs listed in 
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Appendix B.  Additional samples may be collected for waste management characterization and 
disposal purposes. 
4.3 Verification
Sufficient historical site knowledge and previous sampling results from similar mud pit/spill 
investigations exist to indicate that the mud spills in CAU 553 can be closed under no further action.  
However, to support this closure alternative and reduce uncertainty, surface verification samples will 
be collected using a judgmental sampling design from each individual mud spill within CAU 553 to 
confirm that COCs are not present at concentrations that pose a risk to human health or the 
environment.  All samples will be surface samples (0 to 6 in. below ground surface [bgs]) of the 
residual mud and will be collected by hand scoop, hand auger, or other appropriate method.  Site 
preparation activities are expected to be limited to the construction of temporary site exclusion zones, 
visual surveys of each mud spill to identify biasing factors, and radiological surveys at each sample 
location for health and safety purposes.
The following sections outline the judgmental sample design for each CAS and also describes any 
additional activities that may be performed as best management practices (i.e., removal of solid 
material).  During the investigation for all CASs in CAU 553, the SS has the discretion to modify the 
sample locations or order additional biased samples to be collected, but only if the new locations meet 
the decision needs and criteria stipulated in this DQO.  The SS will use professional judgment to 
determine whether biasing factors (e.g., stains, elevated screening levels) are found during Decision I 
sampling that might indicate the need to take subsurface Decision II samples.  The final locations and 
numbers of verification samples to be collected will be determined in the field based on the presence 
of any biasing factors as listed in Section B.5.2.1.  The number and location of verification samples 
will be justified in the Closure Report. 
Because this SAFER Plan only addresses contamination originating from the CAU, it may be 
necessary to distinguish overlapping contamination originating from other sources.  For example, 
widespread surface radiological contamination originating from atmospheric tests will not be 
addressed in the CAU 553 investigation.  To determine whether contamination is from the CAU or 
from other sources, soil samples may be collected from background locations at selected CASs.
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Modifications to the investigation strategy may be required should unexpected field conditions be 
encountered at any CAS.  Significant modifications shall be justified and documented in a Record of 
Technical Change before implementation.  If an unexpected condition indicates that conditions are 
significantly different than the corresponding CSM, the activity will be rescoped and the decision 
makers will be notified.  Field activities at CAU 553 include site preparation, sample location 
selection, sample collection activities, waste characterization, photo-documentation, and collection of 
geo-spatial coordinates.
4.3.1 CAS 19-99-01, Mud Spill
The mud spill at this CAS is not contiguous and is located in several areas on and surrounding an 
8-ft-high soil mound.  The thickest concentrations of mud/clay material can be found in localized 
shallow depressions atop the mound and low areas on the ground surface at the base of the mound 
where the mud spilled down the sides.  A minimum of two biased samples will be collected from the 
mound area with the locations biased towards staining, elevated FSRs, and/or the thickest deposits of 
mud assuming any COPCs will be concentrated in these areas.  Debris surrounding the mud spill 
within the CAS boundaries will not be removed or investigated.  Geophysical surveys of the mound 
indicate no debris is buried, and the nature of the mud spill suggests that mud was deposited only on 
the mound surface.  Figure B.9-1 shows the proposed sample locations.
4.3.2 CAS 19-99-11, Mud Spill
This CAS has three distinct mud spill areas.  Verification samples will be collected from each spill in 
a location with the highest potential to find contamination if present.  In the absence of staining or 
elevated FSRs, a sample will be collected in either the topographic low within the spill area where 
contaminants could be expected to be concentrated or in the center of the spill if no other biasing 
factors exist.  For the North spill, it is anticipated the grout material will be sampled directly in two 
locations, with at least one location at a yellow-stained area on the north end.  For the West spill, the 
darker gray silt/clay material lying atop the native volcanic material will be sampled.  For the South 
spill, any stained area or the darkest gray coloring of the mud will be sampled.  Debris within the 
CAS boundaries will not be removed or investigated.  Figure B.9-2 shows the proposed sample 
locations.
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4.3.3 CAS 20-09-09, Mud Spill
Due to the location of the two bentonite spills within a DOE Operational Readiness Area, it is 
recommended that both bentonite piles be removed as a best management practice and managed as  
waste.  Based on the dimensions of the bentonite spills, the volume to be removed may fill two to 
three 55-gallon drums.  Samples will be collected directly from the bentonite material for waste 
management purposes.  A soil verification sample will then be collected from beneath each of the 
removed bentonite piles to confirm the absence of COPCs in the underlying soil.  If COCs are shown 
to be present, then Decision II samples will be collected, if deemed necessary.  Figure B.9-3 shows 
the proposed sample locations. 
4.3.4 CAS 20-99-03, Mud Spill
The mud spill at this CAS is contiguous and encompasses a large area (750 by 250 ft) where the mud 
is distributed relatively evenly across the site.  This mud spill is the only area of concern for this CAS.  
The pile of steel pellets (based on visual observation of rust) located north of the mud spill does not 
represent an environmental hazard and therefore will not be investigated further.  A radiological 
survey performed on the mud spill indicates no elevated radiological contamination.  Based on these 
data and previous mud pit sampling investigation results, there is no indication that a more extensive 
characterization of the spill area is necessary.  Therefore, only four verification samples are 
recommended with one sample from each quadrant of the spill area to be collected.  See Figure B.9-4 
for the proposed sample locations.  Biasing factors will be identified during a site walkdown and the 
proposed locations will be refined based on the site conditions.  It is anticipated that most of the 
verification samples will be collected in pooled, concentrated areas of the mud due to the lack of 
apparent staining throughout the mud spill.  
4.4 Closure
The following activities, at a minimum, have been identified for closure of these CASs.  The decision 
logic behind the activities is provided in Figure 1-2:
• If no COCs are detected, the CAS will be closed with no further action.
• If a COC is present, remove if feasible and resample.
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• If removal is not feasible, the extent of COC contamination will be determined and 
closure-in-place will be implemented.  The appropriate use restrictions will be implemented 
and documented in the Closure Report. 
The closure objectives will have been met and the CAS will be proposed for closure if the following 
conditions are true:
• A COC is not present at a CAS
• A COC is present and the extent of each COC has been defined.
• Information is sufficient to characterize remediation waste and IDW for disposal.
After completion of CAI and waste management activities, the following actions will be implemented 
before closure of the site Real Estate/Operations Permit:
• Removal of all equipment, wastes, debris, and materials associated with the CAI.
• Grading of site to pre-investigation condition (unless changed condition is necessary under a 
corrective action). 
• Site will be inspected and certified that restoration activities have been completed.
4.5 Duration
Table 4-1 is a tentative duration of activities (in work days) for SAFER activities:       
Table 4-1
CAU 553 SAFER Project Duration
Duration (days) Activity
10 Site Preparation
76 Fieldwork Preparation and Mobilization
10 Sampling
160 Data Assessment
180 Waste Management
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5.0 Reports and Records Availability
Historic information and documents referenced in this plan are retained in the NNSA/NSO project 
files in Las Vegas, Nevada, and can be obtained through written request to the NNSA/NSO Project 
Manager.  This document is available in the DOE public reading rooms located in Las Vegas and 
Carson City, Nevada, or by contacting the appropriate DOE project manager.  The NDEP maintains 
the official Administrative Record for all activities conducted under the auspices of the FFACO.
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6.0 Investigation/Remediation Waste Management
Management of IDW will be based on regulatory requirements, field observations, process 
knowledge, and laboratory results from CAU 553 investigation samples.
Disposable sampling equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE), and rinsate are considered 
potentially contaminated waste only by virtue of contact with potentially contaminated media 
(e.g., soil) or potentially contaminated debris (e.g., construction materials).  Therefore, sampling and 
analysis of IDW, separate from analyses of site investigation samples, may not be necessary for all 
IDW.  However, if associated investigation samples are found to contain contaminants above 
regulatory levels, conservative estimates of total waste contaminant concentrations may be made 
based on the mass of the waste, the amount of contaminated media contained in the waste, and the 
maximum concentration of contamination found in the media.  Direct samples of IDW may also be 
taken to support waste characterization.
Sanitary, hazardous, radioactive, and/or mixed waste, if generated, will be managed and disposed of 
in accordance with applicable DOE orders, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 
state and federal waste regulations, and agreements and permits between DOE and NDEP.
6.1 Waste Minimization 
Investigation activities are planned to minimize IDW generation.  This will be accomplished by 
incorporating the use of process knowledge, visual examination, and/or radiological survey and swipe 
results.  When possible, disturbed media (such as soil removed during trenching) or debris will be 
returned to its original location.  Contained media (e.g., soil managed as waste) as well as other IDW 
will be segregated to the greatest extent possible to minimize generation of hazardous, radioactive, or 
mixed waste.  Hazardous material used at the sites will be controlled in order to limit unnecessary 
generation of hazardous or mixed waste.  Administrative controls, including decontamination 
procedures and waste characterization strategies, will minimize waste generated during 
investigations.
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6.2 Potential Waste Streams
Waste generated during the corrective action activities will include the following potential waste 
streams:
• Personal protective equipment and disposable sampling equipment (e.g., plastic, paper, 
sample containers, aluminum foil, spoons, bowls)
• Decontamination rinsate
• Environmental media (e.g., soil, bentonite)
The on-site management and ultimate disposition of wastes will be determined based on a 
determination of the waste type (e.g., sanitary, low-level, hazardous, hydrocarbon, mixed), or the 
combination of waste types.  A determination of the waste type will be guided by several factors, 
including, but not limited to:  the analytical results of samples either directly or indirectly associated 
with the waste, historical site knowledge, waste generation process knowledge, field observations, 
field-monitoring/screening results, and/or radiological survey/swipe results.
Table 4-2 of the NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b) shall be used to determine whether 
materials may be released to controlled or uncontrolled areas.  On-site IDW management 
requirements by waste type are detailed in the following sections.  Applicable waste management 
regulations and requirements are listed in Table 6-1.    
6.2.1 Sanitary Waste
Sanitary IDW generated at each CAS will be collected, managed, and disposed of in accordance with 
the sanitary waste management regulations and the permits for operation of the NTS 10c Industrial 
Waste Landfill.
Office trash and lunch waste will be placed in the dumpster to be transported to the sanitary landfill 
for disposal.  Sanitary IDW generated at each CAS will only be collected in plastic bags, sealed, 
labeled with the CAS number from each site in which it was generated, and dated.  The waste will 
then be placed in a roll-off box located in Mercury, or other approved roll-off box location.  The 
number of bags of sanitary IDW placed in the roll-off box will be counted as they are placed in the 
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roll-off box, noted in a log, and documented in the Field Activity Daily Log.  These logs will provide 
necessary tracking information for ultimate disposal in the 10c Industrial Waste Landfill. 
Table 6-1
Waste Management Regulations and Requirements
Waste Type Federal Regulation Additional Requirements
Solid (nonhazardous) N/A
NRSa 444.440 - 444.620
NACb 444.570 - 444.7499
NTS Landfill Permit SW13.097.04c
NTS Landfill Permit SW13.097.03d
Liquid/Rinsate (nonhazardous) N/A Water Pollution Control General PermitGNEV93001, Rev. 3iiie
Hazardous RCRA
f,                         
40 CFR 260-282
NRSa 459.400 - 459.600
NACb 444.850 - 444.8746
POCg
Low-Level Radioactive N/A DOE Orders and NTSWACh
Mixed RCRA
f,                        
40 CFR 260-282
NTSWACh
POCg
Hydrocarbon N/A NTS Landfill Permit SW13.097.02
i
NACb 445a.2272
Polychlorinated Biphenyls TSCA
j,                         
40 CFR 761
NRSa 459.400 - 459.600
NACb 444.940 - 444.9555
Asbestos TSCA
j,                         
40 CFR 763
NRSa 618.750 - 618.840
NACb 444.965 - 444.976
aNevada Revised Statutes (NRS, 2005a, b, c)
bNevada Administrative Code (NAC, 2004a and b)
cArea 23 Class II Solid Waste Disposal Site (NDEP, 1997a)
dArea 9 Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site (NDEP, 1997c)
eNevada Test Site Sewage Lagoons (NDEP, 1999)
fResource Conservation and Recovery Act (CFR, 2005a)
gNevada Test Site Performance Objective for the Certification of Nonradioactive Hazardous Waste (BN, 1995)
hNevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria, Rev. 6-01 (NNSA/NSO, 2006c)
iArea 6 Class III Solid Waste Disposal Site for hydrocarbon waste (NDEP, 1997b)
jToxic Substance Control Act (CFR, 2005b and c)
CFR = Code of Federal Regulations NTSWAC = Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria
DOE = U.S. Department of Energy POC = Performance Objective for the Certification of Nonradioactive
N/A = Not applicable             Hazardous Waste
NAC = Nevada Administrative Code    RCRA = Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
NRS = Nevada Revised Statutes TSCA = Toxic Substance Control Act
NTS = Nevada Test Site
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6.2.2 Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Radiological swipe surveys and/or direct-scan surveys may be conducted on reusable sampling 
equipment and the PPE and disposable sampling equipment waste streams exiting a radiologically 
controlled area (RCA).  This allows for the immediate segregation of radioactive waste from waste 
that may be unrestricted regarding radiological release.  Contamination limits, as defined in Table 4-2 
of the NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b), will be used to determine whether such 
waste may be declared unrestricted regarding radiological release versus being declared radioactive 
waste.  Direct sampling of the waste may be conducted to aid in determining whether a particular 
waste unit (e.g., drum of soil) contains low-level radioactive waste, as necessary.  Waste determined 
to be below the values of Table 4-2, by either direct radiological survey/swipe results or through 
process knowledge, will not be managed as potential radioactive waste but will be managed in 
accordance with the appropriate section of this document.  Wastes in excess of Table 4-2 values will 
be managed as potential radioactive waste and be managed in accordance with this section and any 
other applicable sections of this document.
Low-level radioactive waste, if generated, will be managed in accordance with the contractor-specific 
waste certification program plan, DOE orders, and the requirements of the current version of the 
Nevada Test Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NTSWAC) (NNSA/NSO, 2006c).  Potential radioactive 
waste drums containing soil, PPE, disposable sampling equipment, and/or rinsate may be staged at a 
designated RMA or RCA when full or at the end of an investigation phase.  The waste drums will 
remain at the RMA pending certification and disposal under NTSWAC requirements (NNSA/NSO, 
2006c).
6.2.3 Hazardous Waste
The CAU may have waste accumulation areas established according to the needs of the project.  
Satellite accumulation areas and hazardous waste accumulation areas (HWAAs) will be managed 
consistent with the requirements of federal and state regulations. (CFR, 2005a; NAC, 2004b).  The 
HWAAs will be properly controlled for access and equipped with spill kits and appropriate spill 
containment.  Suspected hazardous wastes will be placed in DOT-compliant containers.  All 
containerized hazardous waste will be handled, inspected, and managed in accordance with Title 
40 CFR 265 Subpart I (CFR, 2005a).  These provisions include managing the waste in containers 
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compatible with the waste type, and segregating incompatible waste types so that in the event of a 
spill, leak, or release, incompatible wastes shall not contact one another.  The HWAAs will be 
covered under a site-specific emergency response and contingency action plan until such time that the 
waste is determined to be nonhazardous or all containers of hazardous waste have been removed from 
the storage area.  Hazardous waste will be characterized in accordance with the requirement of 
Title 40 CFR 261.  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-“listed” waste has not been identified at 
CAU 553.  Any waste determined to be hazardous will be managed and transported in accordance 
with RCRA and DOT requirements to a permitted treatment, storage, and disposal facility 
(CFR, 2005a). 
6.2.4 Hydrocarbon Waste
Hydrocarbon soil waste containing more than 100 milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) of TPH will be 
managed on site in a drum or other appropriate container until fully characterized.  Hydrocarbon 
waste may be disposed of at a designated hydrocarbon landfill (NDEP, 1997b), an appropriate 
hydrocarbon waste management facility (e.g., recycling facility), or other method in accordance with 
State of Nevada regulations.
6.2.5 Mixed Low-Level Waste
Mixed waste, if generated, shall be managed and dispositioned according to the requirements of 
RCRA (CFR, 2005a) or subject to agreements between NNSA/NSO and the State of Nevada, as well 
as DOE requirements for radioactive waste.  The waste will be marked with the words “Hazardous 
Waste Pending Analysis and Radioactive Waste Pending Analysis.”  Waste characterized as mixed 
will not be stored for a period of time that exceeds RCRA requirements unless subject to agreements 
between NNSA/NSO and the State of Nevada.  The mixed waste shall be transported via an approved 
hazardous waste/radioactive waste transporter to the NTS transuranic waste storage pad for storage 
pending treatment or disposal.  Mixed waste with hazardous waste constituent concentrations below 
Land Disposal Restrictions may be disposed of at the NTS Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management 
Site if the waste meets the requirements of the NTSWAC (NNSA/NSO, 2006a), the NTS NDEP 
permit for a Hazardous Waste Management Facility (NEV HW0009 [NDEP, 2000]), and the RCRA 
Part B Permit Application for Waste Management Activities at the NTS (DOE/NV, 1999).  Mixed 
waste constituent concentrations exceeding Land Disposal Restrictions will require development of a 
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treatment and disposal plan under the requirements of the Mutual Consent Agreement between DOE 
and the State of Nevada (NDEP, 1995).
6.2.6 Polychlorinated Biphenyls 
The management of PCBs is governed by the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) (USC, 1976) 
and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR 761 (CFR, 2005b).  Polychlorinated biphenyl 
contamination may be found as a sole contaminant or in combination with any of the types of waste 
discussed in this document.  For example, PCBs may be a co-contaminant in soil that contains a 
RCRA “characteristic” waste (PCB/hazardous waste), or in soil that contains radioactive wastes 
(PCB/radioactive waste), or in mixed waste (PCB/radioactive/hazardous waste).  The IDW will be 
initially evaluated using analytical results for media samples from the investigation.  If any type of 
PCB waste is generated, it will be managed according to 40 CFR 761 (CFR, 2005b) as well as 
State of Nevada requirements, (NAC, 2004a) guidance, and agreements with NNSA/NSO.
6.3 Management of Specific Waste Streams
6.3.1 Personal Protective Equipment
Personal protective equipment and disposable sampling equipment will be visually inspected for 
stains, discoloration, and gross contamination, as the waste is generated; and also evaluated for 
radiological contamination.  Staining and/discoloration will be assumed to be the result of contact 
with potentially contaminated media such as soil, sludge, or liquid.  Gross contamination is the visible 
contamination of an item (e.g., clumps of soil/sludge on a sampling spoon or free liquid smeared on a 
glove).  While gross contamination can often be removed through decontamination methods, removal 
of gross contamination from small items, such as gloves or booties is not typically conducted.  Any 
IDW that meets this description will be segregated and managed as potentially “characteristic” 
hazardous waste.  This segregated population of waste will be:  (1) assigned the characterization of 
the soil/sludge that was sampled, (2) sampled directly, or (3) undergo further evaluation using the 
soil/sludge sample results to determine how much soil/sludge would need to be present in the waste to 
exceed regulatory levels.  Waste that is determined to be hazardous will be entered into an approved 
waste management system, where it will be managed and dispositioned according to RCRA 
requirements or subject to agreements between NNSA/NSO and the State of Nevada.  The PPE and 
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disposable sampling equipment that is not visibly stained, discolored, or grossly contaminated and 
that is within the radiological free-release criteria will be managed as nonhazardous sanitary waste.
6.3.2 Management of Decontamination Rinsate
Rinsate at CAU 553 will not be considered hazardous waste unless there is evidence that the rinsate 
may display a RCRA characteristic.  Evidence may include such things as the presence of a visible 
sheen, pH, or association with equipment/materials used to respond to a release/spill of a hazardous 
waste/substance.  Decontamination rinsate that is potentially hazardous (using associated sample 
results and/or process knowledge) will be managed as characteristic hazardous waste (CFR, 2005a).  
The regulatory status of the potentially hazardous rinsate will be determined through the application 
of associated sample results or through direct sampling.  If the associated samples do not indicate the 
presence of hazardous constituents, then the rinsate will be considered nonhazardous.
The disposal of nonhazardous rinsate will be consistent with guidance established in current 
NNSA/NSO Fluid Management Plans for the NTS as follows:
• Rinsate that is determined to be nonhazardous and contaminated to less than 5x Safe Drinking 
Water Standards (SDWS) is not restricted as to disposal.  Nonhazardous rinsate contaminated 
at 5x to 10x SDWS will be disposed of in an established infiltration basin or solidified and 
disposed of as sanitary waste or low-level waste in accordance with the respective sections of 
this document.
• Nonhazardous rinsate contaminated at greater than 10x SDWS will be disposed of in a lined 
basin or solidified and disposed of as sanitary waste or low-level waste in accordance with the 
respective sections of this document.
6.3.3 Management of Soil/Bentonite
This waste stream consists of soil and/or bentonite waste removed for disposal during soil sampling, 
excavation, and/or drilling.  This waste stream will be characterized based on laboratory analytical 
results from representative locations or sampled directly.  If the soil is determined to potentially 
contain COCs, the material will either be managed on site or containerized for transportation to an 
appropriate disposal site.
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On-site management of the potentially hazardous waste soil will be allowed only if it is managed 
within an area of concern and it is appropriate to defer the management of the waste until the final 
remediation of the site.  If this option is chosen, the waste soil shall be protected from run-on and 
run-off using appropriate protective measures based on the type of contaminant(s) (e.g., covered with 
plastic and bermed).
Management of soil waste for disposal consists of placing the waste in containers, labeling the 
containers, temporarily storing the containers until shipped, and shipping the waste to a disposal site.  
The containers, labels, management of stored waste, transport to the disposal site, and disposal shall 
be appropriate for the type of waste (e.g., hazardous, hydrocarbon, mixed).
Note that soils placed back into a borehole or excavation in the same approximate location from 
which it originated is not considered to be a waste.
6.3.4 Management of Debris
This waste stream can vary depending on site conditions.  Debris that requires removal for the 
investigation activities (soil sampling, excavation, and/or drilling) must be characterized for proper 
management and disposition.  Historical site knowledge, waste generation process knowledge, field 
observations, field-monitoring/screening results, radiological survey/swipe results and/or the 
analytical results of samples, either directly or indirectly associated with the waste, may be used to 
characterized the debris.  Debris will be visually inspected for stains, discoloration, and gross 
contamination.  Debris may be deemed reusable, recyclable, sanitary waste, hazardous waste, PCB 
waste, or low-level waste.  Waste that is not sanitary will be entered into an approved waste 
management system, where it will be managed and dispositioned according to requirements and 
agreements between NNSA/NSO and the State of Nevada.  The debris will either be managed on site 
by berming and covering next to the excavation, placement in a container(s), or left on the footprint of 
the CAS and its disposition deferred until implementation of corrective action at the site.
6.3.5 Field-Screening Waste
The use of field test kits and/or instruments may result in the generation of small quantities of 
hazardous wastes.  If hazardous waste is produced by field screening, it will be segregated from other 
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IDW and managed in accordance with the hazardous waste regulations (CFR, 2005a).  For sites 
where field-screening samples contain radioactivity above background levels, field-screening 
methods that have the potential to generate hazardous waste will not be used, thus avoiding the 
potential to generate mixed waste.  In the event a mixed waste is generated, the waste will be 
managed in accordance with the requirements in Section 6.2.5.
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7.0 Quality Assurance/Quality Control
The overall objective of the characterization activities described in this SAFER Plan is to collect 
accurate and defensible data to support the selection and implementation of a closure alternative for 
each CAS in CAU 553.  Sections 7.1 and 7.2 discuss the collection of required quality control (QC) 
samples in the field and quality assurance (QA) requirements for laboratory/analytical data to achieve 
closure.  Unless otherwise stated in this SAFER Plan or required by the results of the DQO process 
(see Appendix B), this investigation will adhere to the Industrial Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002a).
7.1 Sample Collection Activities
Field QC samples will be collected in accordance with established procedures.  Field QC samples are 
collected and analyzed to aid in determining the validity of environmental sample results.  The 
number of required QC samples depends on the types and number of environmental samples 
collected.  The minimum frequency of collecting and analyzing QC samples for this investigation, as 
determined in the DQO process, include:
• Trip blanks (1 per sample cooler containing VOC environmental samples)
• Equipment rinsate blanks (1 per sampling event for each type of decontamination procedure)
• Source blanks (1 per lot of source material that contacts sampled media)
• Field duplicates (1 per 20 environmental samples or 1 per CAS per matrix if less than 20)
• Field blanks (1 per 20 environmental samples or 1 per day)
• Laboratory QC samples (1 per 20 environmental samples)
Additional QC samples may be submitted based on site conditions at the discretion of the Task 
Manager or SS.  Field QC samples shall be analyzed using the same analytical procedures 
implemented for associated environmental samples.  Additional details regarding field QC samples 
are available in the Industrial Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002a).
7.2 Applicable Laboratory/Analytical Data Quality Indicators
The DQIs are qualitative and quantitative descriptors used in interpreting the degree of acceptability 
or utility of data.  Data quality indicators are used to evaluate the entire measurement system and 
laboratory measurement processes (i.e., analytical method performance) as well as to evaluate 
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individual analytical results (i.e., parameter performance).  The quality and usability of data used to 
make DQO decisions will be assessed based on the following DQIs:
• Precision
• Accuracy/bias
• Representativeness
• Comparability
• Completeness
• Sensitivity
Table 7-1 provides the established analytical method/measurement system performance criteria for 
each of the DQIs and the potential impacts to the decision if the criteria are not met.  The following 
subsections discuss each of the DQIs that will be used to assess the quality of laboratory data.  Due to 
changes in analytical methodology and laboratory contracts, criteria for precision and accuracy in 
Tables 7-2 and 7-3 that vary from corresponding information in the Industrial Sites QAPP will 
supersede that information in the Industrial Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002a).           
7.2.1 Precision
Precision is a measure of the repeatability of the analysis process from sample collection through 
analysis results.  It is used to assess the variability between two equal samples.
Determinations of precision will be made for laboratory duplicate samples.  The laboratory sample 
duplicates are an aliquot, or subset, of a field sample generated in the laboratory.  They are not a 
separate sample but a split, or portion, of an existing sample.  Typically, laboratory duplicate 
QC samples may include matrix spike duplicate (MSD) and laboratory control sample (LCS) 
duplicate samples for organic, inorganic, and radiological analyses. 
Precision is a quantitative measure used to assess overall analytical method and field-sampling 
performance as well as to assess the need to “flag” (qualify) individual parameter results when 
corresponding QC sample results are not within established control limits.
The criteria used for the assessment of chemical precision when both results are greater than or equal 
to 5x reporting limit (RL) is 20 percent and 35 percent for aqueous and soil samples, respectively.  
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When either result is less than 5x RL, a control limit of ±1x RL and ±2x RL for aqueous and soil 
samples, respectively, is applied to the absolute difference.
The criteria used for the assessment of radiological precision when both results are greater than or 
equal to 5x MDC is 20 percent and 35 percent for aqueous and soil samples, respectively.  When 
either result is less than 5x MDC, the normalized difference should be between -2 and +2 for aqueous 
and soil samples.
Table 7-1
Laboratory and Analytical Performance Criteria for CAU 553 DQIs
Data Quality 
Indicator Performance Metric
Potential Impact on Decision 
If Performance Metric Not Met
Precision
At least 80% of the sample results for each 
measured contaminant are not qualified for 
precision based on the criteria for each analytical 
method-specific and laboratory-specific criteria 
presented in Tables 7-2 and 7-3.
If the performance metric is not met, the 
affected analytical results from each 
affected CAS will be assessed to determine 
whether there is sufficient confidence in 
analytical results to use the data in making 
DQO decisions.
Accuracy
At least 80% of the sample results for each 
measured contaminant are not qualified for 
accuracy based on the method-specific and 
laboratory-specific criteria presented in 
Tables 7-2 and 7-3.
If the performance metric is not met, the 
affected analytical results from each 
affected CAS will be assessed to determine 
whether there is sufficient confidence in 
analytical results to use the data in making 
DQO decisions.
Sensitivity Minimum detectable concentrations are less than or equal to respective FALs.
Cannot determine whether COCs are 
present or migrating at levels of concern.
Comparability
Sampling, handling, preparation, analysis, 
reporting, and data validation are performed 
using standard methods and procedures.
Inability to combine data with data obtained 
from other sources and/or inability to 
compare data to regulatory action levels.
Representativeness
Samples contain contaminants at concentrations 
present in the environmental media from which 
they were collected.
Analytical results will not represent true site 
conditions.  Inability to make appropriate 
DQO decisions.
Completenessa 80% of the CAS-specific COPCs have valid results.
Cannot support/defend decision on whether 
COCs are present.
Extent Completeness 100% of COCs used to define extent have valid results.
Extent of contamination cannot be 
accurately determined.
Clean Closure 
Completenessa 100% of COCs have valid results.
Cannot determine whether COCs remain in 
soil.
aNo targeted COPCs for this investigation.
CAS = Corrective action site DQI = Data quality indicator
COC = Contaminant of concern DQO = Data quality objective
COPC = Contaminant of potential concern FAL = Final action level
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Table 7-2
Analytical Requirements for Radionuclides for CAU 553
 (Page 1 of 2)
Parameter/Analyte Matrix Analytical Method MDC
a PALb,c Laboratory Precision (RPD)
Percent Recovery 
(%R)
Gamma Spectroscopy
Americium-241 Soil HASL-300d 2.0 pCi/ge 12.7 pCi/g Relative Percent 
Difference (RPD) 35%
Normalized Difference
 -2<ND<2f
Laboratory Control 
Sample Recovery 
80-120g Percent 
Recovery (%R)
Cesium-137 Soil HASL-300d 0.5 pCi/ge 12.2 pCi/g
Cobalt-60 Soil HASL-300d 0.5 pCi/ge 2.68 pCi/g
Other Radionuclides
Plutonium-238 Soil ASTM C 1001-00h 0.05 pCi/g 13.0 pCi/g
Relative Percent 
Difference (RPD) 35%
Normalized Difference
 -2<ND<2f
Laboratory Control 
Sample Recovery 
80-120g Percent 
Recovery (%R)
Chemical Yield 
30-105i %R
(not applicable for 
tritium)
Plutonium-239/240 Soil ASTM C 1001-00h 0.05 pCi/g 12.7 pCi/g
Strontium-90 Soil HASL 300d 0.5 pCi/g 838 pCi/g
Uranium-234 Soil ASTM C 1000-02j 0.05 pCi/g 143 pCi/g
Uranium-235 Soil ASTMj 0.05 pCi/g 17.6 pCi/g
Uranium-238 Soil ASTM C 1000-02j 0.05 pCi/g 105 pCi/g
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aThe MDC is the lowest concentration of a radionuclide, if present in a sample, that can be detected with a 95 percent confidence level.
bThe PALs for soil are based on the National Council for Radiation Protection and Measurement (NCRP) Report No. 129 Recommended Screening Limits for Contaminated Soil and 
Review of Factors Relevant to Site-Specific Studies (NCRP, 1999) scaled to 25 mrem/yr dose and the guidelines for residual concentration of radionuclides in DOE Order 5400.5 
(DOE, 1993).
cPALs for liquids will be developed as needed.
dThe Procedures Manual of the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, HASL-300 (DOE, 1997).
eMDCs vary depending on the presence of other gamma-emitting radionuclides in the sample and are relative to the MDC for cesium-137.
f ND is not RPD, it is another measure of precision used to evaluate duplicate analyses.  The ND is calculated as the difference between two results divided by the square root of the 
sum of the squares of their total propagated uncertainties.  Evaluation of Radiochemical Data Usability (Paar and Porterfield, 1997).
gEPA Contract Laboratory Program Statement of Work for Inorganic Analysis (EPA, 1988; 1994; and 1995).
hStandard Test Method for Radiochemical Determination of Plutonium in Soil by Alpha Spectroscopy (ASTM, 2002).
iGeneral Radiochemistry and Routine Analytical Services Protocol (GRASP) (EG&G Rocky Flats, 1991).  The chemical yield only applies to plutonium, uranium, and strontium.
jStandard Test Method for Radiochemical Determination of Uranium Isotopes in Soil by Alpha Spectrometry (ASTM, 2000).
ASTM = American Society for Testing and Materials
EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
HASL = Health and Safety Laboratory
MDC = Minimum detectable concentration
mrem/yr = Millirem per year
ND = Normalized difference
PAL = Preliminary action level
pCi/g = Picocuries per gram
pCi/L = Picocuries per liter
UGTA = Underground Test Area
Table 7-2
Analytical Requirements for Radionuclides for CAU 553
 (Page 2 of 2)
Parameter/Analyte Matrix Analytical Method MDC
a PALb,c Laboratory Precision (RPD)
Percent Recovery 
(%R)
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Table 7-3
Analytical Requirements for Chemical COPCs for CAU 553 
Parameter/Analyte Medium orMatrix
Analytical 
Method
Minimum Detectable
Concentration
(MDC)
Laboratory 
Precision 
(RPD)a
Percent 
Recovery (%R)b
ORGANICS
Total Volatile Organic Compounds Soil 8260Bc Parameter-specific EQLsd Lab-specifice Lab-specifice
Total Semivolatile Organic Compounds Soil 8270Cc Parameter-specific EQLsd Lab-specifice Lab-specifice
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons-
Diesel-Range Organics Soil
8015B 
modifiedc 25 mg/kg
f Lab-specifice Lab-specifice
See Table 7-2 for the analytical requirements for radionuclides.
aPrecision is estimated from the RPD of the laboratory or field duplicates MSD and LCSD are spiked.  It is calculated by:  RPD = 100 x (|A1-A2|)/[(A1+A2)/2], 
where A1 = Concentration of the parameter in the initial sample aliquot, A2 = Concentration of the parameter in the duplicate sample aliquot.
bAccuracy is assessed from the %R of parameters spiked into a blank or sample matrix of interest, or from the recovery of surrogate compounds spiked into 
each sample.  The recovery of each spiked parameter is calculated by:  %R = 100 x (As-Au/An), where  
As = Concentration of the parameter in the spiked sample, Au = Concentration of the parameter in the unspiked sample,  
An = Concentration increase that should result from spiking the sample.
cEPA Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste Physical/Chemical Methods, 3rd Edition, Parts 1-4, (SW-846) CD-ROM, Washington, DC (EPA,1996).
dEQL as given in SW-846 (EPA, 1996).
eRPD and %R Performance Criteria are developed and generated in-house by the laboratory according to approved laboratory procedures.
fIndustrial Sites Quality Assurance Project Plan (NNSA/NV, 2002a).
EPA = U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EQL = Estimated quantitation limit
LCSD = Laboratory control sample duplicate
mg/kg = Milligrams per kilogram
MSD = Matrix spike duplicate
RPD = Relative percent difference 
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Any values outside the specified criteria do not necessarily result in the qualification of analytical 
data.  It is only one factor in making an overall judgment about the quality of the reported analytical 
results.  The performance metric for assessing the DQI of precision on DQO decisions (Table 7-1) is 
that at least 80 percent of sample results for each measured contaminant are not qualified due to 
duplicates exceeding the criteria.  If this performance is not met, an assessment will be conducted in 
the Closure Report on the impacts to DQO decisions specific to affected contaminants and CASs.
7.2.2 Accuracy/Bias
Accuracy is a measure of the closeness of an individual measurement to the true value.  It is used to 
assess the performance of laboratory measurement processes.
Accuracy is determined by analyzing a reference material of known parameter concentration or by 
re-analyzing a sample to which a material of known concentration or amount of parameter has been 
added (spiked).  Accuracy will be evaluated based on results from three types of spiked samples:  
matrix spike (MS), LCS, and surrogates (organics).  The LCS sample is analyzed with the field 
samples using the same sample preparation, reagents, and analytical methods employed for the 
samples.  One LCS will be prepared with each batch of samples for analysis by a specific 
measurement.
The criteria used for the assessment of organic chemical accuracy are developed and generated by the 
laboratory according to approved laboratory procedures.  The criteria used for the assessment of 
radiochemical accuracy are 80 to 120 percent for LCS and MS recoveries.
Any values outside the specified criteria do not necessarily result in the qualification of analytical 
data.  It is only one factor in making an overall judgment about the quality of the reported analytical 
results.  Factors beyond laboratory control, such as sample matrix effects, can cause the measured 
values to be outside of the established criteria.  Therefore, the entire sampling and analytical process 
may be evaluated when determining the usability of the affected data.
The performance metric for assessing the DQI of accuracy on DQO decisions (Table 7-1) is that at 
least 80 percent of the sample results for each measured contaminant are not qualified for accuracy.  
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If this performance is not met, an assessment will be conducted in the Closure Report on the impacts 
to DQO decisions specific to affected contaminants and CASs.
7.2.3 Representativeness
Representativeness is the degree to which sample characteristics accurately and precisely represent a 
characteristics of a population or an environmental condition (EPA, 1987).  Representativeness is 
assured by carefully developing the sampling strategy during the DQO process such that false 
negative and false positive decision errors are minimized.  The criteria listed in DQO Step 6 - Specify 
Performance or Acceptance Criteria are:
• For Decision I judgmental sampling, having a high degree of confidence that the sample 
locations selected will identify COCs if present anywhere within the CAS. 
• Having a high degree of confidence that analyses conducted will be sufficient to detect any 
COCs present in the samples. 
• For Decision II, having a high degree of confidence that the sample locations selected will 
identify the extent of COCs.
These are qualitative measures that will be used to assess measurement system performance for 
representativeness.  The assessment of this qualitative criterion will be presented in the Closure 
Report.
7.2.4 Comparability
Comparability is a qualitative parameter expressing the confidence with which one dataset can be 
compared to another (EPA, 1987).  The criteria for the evaluation of comparability will be that all 
sampling, handling, preparation, analysis, reporting, and data validation were performed using 
approved standard methods and procedures.  This will ensure that data from this project can be 
compared to regulatory action levels that were developed based on data generated using the same or 
comparable methods and procedures.  An evaluation of comparability will be presented in the Closure 
Report.
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7.2.5 Completeness
Completeness is defined as generating sufficient data of the appropriate quality to satisfy the data 
needs identified in the DQOs.  For judgmental sampling, completeness will be evaluated using both a 
quantitative measure and a qualitative assessment.  The quantitative measurement to be used to 
evaluate completeness is presented in Table 7-1 and is based on the percentage of measurements 
made that are judged to be valid.  For the judgmental sampling approach, the completeness goal for 
COPCs is 80 percent; there are no targeted contaminants for this investigation.  If this goal is not 
achieved, the dataset will be assessed for potential impacts on making DQO decisions.
The qualitative assessment of completeness is an evaluation of the sufficiency of information 
available to make DQO decisions.  This assessment will be based on meeting the data needs identified 
in the DQOs and will be presented in the Closure Report.  Additional samples will be collected if it is 
determined that the number of samples do not meet completeness criteria.
7.2.6 Sensitivity 
Sensitivity is the capability of a method or instrument to discriminate between measurement 
responses representing different levels of the variable of interest (EPA, 2001).  The evaluation criteria 
for this parameter will be that measurement sensitivity (detection limits) will be less than or equal to 
the corresponding FALs.  If this criterion is not achieved, the affected data will be assessed for 
usability and potential impacts on meeting site characterization objectives.  This assessment will be 
presented in the Closure Report.
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A.1.0 Project Organization
The NNSA/NSO Federal Sub-Project Director is Kevin Cabble, who can be reached at 
(702) 295-5000.  The NNSA/NSO Task Manager is Sabine Curtis, who can be reached at 
(702) 295-0542. 
The identification of the project Health and Safety Officer and the Quality Assurance Officer can be 
found in the appropriate plan.  However, personnel are subject to change, and it is suggested that the 
NNSA/NSO Project Manager be contacted for further information.  The Task Manager will be 
identified in the FFACO Monthly Activity Report before the start of field activities. 
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B.1.0 Introduction
The DQO process described in this appendix is a seven-step, systematic planning process based on 
the scientific method used to plan data collection activities and define performance criteria for the 
CAU 553, Mud Pits and Cellars, field investigation.  The DQOs are designed to ensure that the data 
collected will provide sufficient and reliable information to determine the appropriate corrective 
actions, verify the adequacy of existing information, provide sufficient data to implement the 
corrective actions, and verify that closure was achieved.
The CAU 553 investigation will be based on the DQOs presented in this appendix as developed by 
representatives of NDEP and NNSA/NSO.  The seven steps of the DQO process presented in 
Sections B.3.0 through B.9.0 were developed in accordance with EPA Guidance on Systematic 
Planning Using the Data Quality Objectives Process (EPA QA/G-4) (EPA, 2006). 
In general, the procedures used in the DQO process provide:
• A method to establish performance or acceptance criteria, which serve as the basis for 
designing a plan for collecting data of sufficient quality and quantity to support the goals of a 
study.
• Criteria that will be used to establish the final data collection design such as:
- the nature of the problem that has initiated the study and a conceptual model of the 
environmental hazard to be investigated.
- the decisions or estimates that need to be made and the order of priority for resolving them.
- the type of data needed.
- an analytic approach or decision rule that defines the logic for how the data will be used to 
draw conclusions from the study findings.
• Acceptable quantitative criteria on the quality and quantity of the data to be collected, relative 
to the ultimate use of the data.
• A data collection design that will generate data meeting the quantitative and qualitative 
criteria specified.  A data collection design specifies the type, number, location, and physical 
quantity of samples and data, as well as the QA and QC activities that will ensure that 
sampling design and measurement errors are managed sufficiently to meet the performance or 
acceptance criteria specified in the DQOs.
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B.2.0 Background Information
The following four CASs that comprise CAU 553 are located in NTS Areas 19 and 20, as shown in 
Figure B.2-1:    
• CAS 19-99-01, Mud Spill
• CAS 19-99-11, Mud Spill
• CAS 20-09-09, Mud Spill
• CAS 20-99-03, Mud Spill
The following sections provide a CAS description, physical setting and operational history, release 
information, and previous investigation results for each CAS.  The COPCs identified for the mud 
spills in CAU 553 have been determined based on historical knowledge and previous investigation 
results conducted under the Mud Pit Risk-Based Closure Strategy Report (NNSA/NSO, 2004a) and 
the CAU 530-535 Closure Report (NNSA/NSO, 2006a).  Both of these reports describe the 
operational drilling processes conducted at the NTS associated with nuclear testing.  The CAU 553 
mud spills are assumed to be a result of similar operational processes as the NTS mud pits as well as 
similarly compositional for mud and additive contents. 
B.2.1 CAS 19-99-01, Mud Spill
Corrective Action Site 19-99-01 consists of the environmental release associated with a mud spill 
located on and surrounding a dirt mound located north and adjacent to the fenced U-19ad potential 
crater area (REECo, 1991).  
Physical Setting - CAS 19-99-01 is located in Area 19 adjacent to the north side of the fenced U-19ad 
potential crater area east of Pahute Mesa Road.  The mud spill is located on top of a dirt mound and 
the spill extends downslope in several directions with a small portion extending past the U-19ad fence 
line.  The dirt mound is approximately 8 ft high and covers an area of approximately 1,250 ft2.   
Scattered vegetation is growing on and around the dirt mound and within the mud.  Several pieces of 
debris are visible within the area and the ground surface has been disturbed and mounded in several 
locations.  Surface soil, including the mound, consists of light-brown to pinkish-brown, silt-to sand- 
size volcanic material.  The thickness of alluvium in the area is unknown; however, the U-19ad 
emplacement hole penetrated 4,392 ft of alluvium (NNSA/NSO, 2004b).  The nearest 
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Figure B.2-1
Nevada Test Site Map with CAU 553 CAS Locations
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U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) monitoring well to this CAS is Water Well U-19bk at about 1.9 mi 
northwest of the CAS and has a depth to groundwater of 2,198 ft bgs (USGS/DOE, 2006b).  The 
nearest water use well is inactive and located about 2.0 mi southeast of the CAS (USGS/DOE, 
2006c).
Operational History - The area was used for conducting an underground weapons-related test at 
U-19ad.  The LANL Chancellor test was conducted on September 1, 1983, as a part of Operational 
Phalanx (DOE/NV, 2000).  Based on proximity, CAS 19-99-01 mud spill is believed to be associated 
with pre- and/or post-test drilling activities at U-19ad; however, several other tests were conducted in 
the vicinity of the mud spill and drilling activities at these tests may have contributed to the release of 
drilling mud.  Therefore, the mud spill release is assumed to be similar in operation and composition 
to NTS mud pit material (DOE/NV, 2001). 
Release Information - An environmental release associated with drilling activities occurred adjacent 
to the U-19ad potential crater area.  The release may contain TPH and potentially radioactive 
constituents based on process knowledge of mud pits and drilling processes.
Previous Investigation Results - Geophysical surveys were conducted in 2002 (Shaw) and 2006 
(Fahringer) and identified one anomaly to the west of the mound, most likely due to corrugated metal 
casing partially visible at the surface.  No other buried metal was detected below the soil mound.  A 
radiological survey conducted at the site identified elevated gamma readings in the southeast corner 
of the site; however, it was determined that the site poses no risk to human health from residual 
radiological contamination (Alderson, 2002).  No soil analytical results were identified for this CAS.
B.2.2 CAS 19-99-11, Mud Spill
Corrective Action Site 19-99-11 consists of the environmental releases associated with three mud 
spills located approximately 50 ft east of the fenced U-19q/U-19q PS#1D potential crater area 
(REECo, 1991). 
Physical Setting - The CAS is located in Area 19 west of the Pahute Mesa Road near the U-19q 
potential crater area.  The three separate mud spills are referred to as the south, north, and west spills 
and have a total area of approximately 1,167 ft2.  The south mud spill is the smallest and measures 
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approximately 216 ft2 and consists of a thin weathered layer of brown-gray powdery mud that overlies 
a cracked harder layer of darker gray mud.  The west spill is approximately 458 ft2 and consists of a 
1-ft-thick layer of crumbled gray mud overlying a 3-ft mound of native soil.  The north spill is 
approximately 493 ft2 and appears to be consist of gray grout aggregate with areas of yellow staining.  
Black wire debris and wood fencing debris are visible on the surface.  The nearest USGS monitoring 
well to this CAS is Water Well U-19bk at about 1.9 mi northwest of the CAS and has a depth to 
groundwater of 2,198 ft bgs (USGS/DOE, 2006b).  The nearest water use well is inactive and located 
about 2.0 mi southeast of the CAS (USGS/DOE, 2006a). 
Operational History - The area was used for conducting an underground weapons-related test at 
U-19q.  The LLNL Camembert test was conducted on June 26, 1975, as a part of Operation Bedrock 
(DOE/NV, 2000).  Based on proximity, CAS 19-99-11 mud spill is believed to be associated with 
post-test drilling activities at drill hole U-19q PS#1D.  Therefore, the mud spill release is assumed to 
be similar in operation and composition to NTS mud pit material (DOE/NV, 2001). 
Release Information - An environmental release associated with drilling activities occurred adjacent 
to the U-19q potential crater area.  The release may contain TPH and potentially radioactive 
constituents based on process knowledge of mud pits and drilling processes.
Previous Investigation Results - No site specific geophysical or radiological surveys or analytical 
results were identified for this CAS. 
B.2.3 CAS 20-09-09, Mud Spill
Corrective Action Site 20-09-09 consists of the environmental release associated with two bentonite 
mud spills located approximately 20 ft south of mud mixing plants at the Area 20 Pahute Mesa Mud 
Plant (REECo, 1992). 
Physical Setting - The site is located in the Pahute Mesa Mud Plant at RSM 20 P 114 in Area 20 and 
consists of two dry substance spills of dry, cracked gray bentonite on the ground surface.  The 
dimensions of the each spill are approximately 3 by 12 ft and 2 to 12 in. thick.  The dimensions are 
easily visible compared to the graded pad/road surface.  The soil within and around the site appears to 
be native volcanic rock.  The nearest well to CAS 20-09-09 is U20WW, located about 700 ft 
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southwest of the CAS, at a depth of 2,050 ft bgs, and is an active withdrawal location for institutional 
use of water (USGS/DOE, 2006a). 
Operational History - The site is the location of the inactive Pahute Mesa Mud Plant at which mud 
mixing and water distribution operations for drilling activities in Pahute Mesa were conducted 
(Geary, 1965).  Mud was generated at the plant for use in Area 20 drilling activities.  Drilling mud is 
typically a combination of powdered bentonite clay mixed with water to form a viscous fluid 
(REECo, 1994).  The dry substance spill is believed to have resulted from these mud mixing activities 
and not used in actual drilling processes.  Currently the site is marked as a DOE Operational 
Readiness Area. 
Release Information - An environmental release associated with mud mixing activities occurred north 
of the mud mixing machines.  
Previous Investigation Results - No site specific geophysical or radiological surveys or analytical 
results were identified for this CAS.  
B.2.4 CAS 20-99-03, Mud Spill
Corrective Action Site 20-99-03 consists of the environmental release associated with the mud spill 
located south/east of the fenced U-20aq crater area (REECo, 1991). 
Physical Setting - The mud spill is located in Area 20 south of the U-20aq crater area and consists of 
one continuous area of dried mud on the ground surface.  The spill area measures approximately 
750 by 300 ft and is light pinkish-brown clay/silty material, dry, and cracked.  The thickness varies 
between 1 to 6 in. thick.  A pile of small steel pellets (based on visual observations of rust) is located 
on the northeast side of the spill but does not represent a health hazard.  The dimensions of the mud 
spill are easily visible against the native black/red volcanic surface and an active dirt road dissects the 
spill in half.  The nearest well is U-20WW, an unused test well, that is located approximately 2.4 mi 
south of the CAS (USGS/DOE, 2006a). 
Operational History - The area was used for conducting the underground Darwin test by LLNL and 
the United Kingdom on June 25, 1986, in U-20aq (DOE/NV, 2000; RSN, 1991).  Based on proximity 
to U-20aq, CAS 20-99-03 mud spill is believed to be associated with post-test drilling activities at 
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U-20aq.  There is a potential that mud may have been drained in this area from metal piping used in 
drilling operations to direct the drilling fluids/cuttings from the drill hole to the mud pit.  Another 
possibility is that a holding tank containing drill mud may have spilled in the area.  Therefore, the 
mud spill release is assumed to be similar in operation and composition to NTS mud pit material 
(DOE/NV, 2001).  
Release Information - An environmental release associated with drilling activities occurred adjacent 
to the U-19aq crater area.  The release may contain TPH and potentially radioactive constituents 
based on process knowledge of mud pits and drilling processes. 
Previous Investigation Results - No geophysical survey or analytical results were identified for this 
CAS.  A radiological survey was conducted in 2006, and it was determined that the site poses no risk 
from residual radiological contamination (SNJV, 2006).  
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B.3.0 Step 1 - State the Problem
Step 1 of the DQO process defines the problem that requires study, identifies the planning team, and 
develops a conceptual model of the environmental hazard to be investigated.
The problem statement for CAU 553 is:  “Sufficient historical and analytical information is available 
to support a no further action closure alternative for all CASs in CAU 553; however, verification 
samples are required to confirm the absence of COCs at levels that could pose a risk to human health 
or the environment.”
B.3.1 Planning Team Members
The DQO planning team consists of representatives from NDEP, NNSA/NSO, Stoller-Navarro Joint 
Venture (SNJV), and National Security Technologies, LLC.  The primary decision-makers are the 
NDEP and NNSA/NSO representatives.  Table B.3-1 lists representatives from each organization in 
attendance at the July 27, 2006, DQO meeting.       
Table B.3-1
Data Quality Objective Meeting Participants for CAU 553 July 27, 2006
 (Page 1 of 2)
Affiliation Department/Project Team Function
NDEP NDEP Representative
NNSA/NSO Environmental Restoration Project Federal Industrial Sites Sub-Project Task Manager
NSTec Environmental Restoration Deputy Project Manager
NSTec Environmental Restoration Field Support Manager
SNJV Industrial Sites Project Manager
SNJV Industrial Sites Technical Coordinator
SNJV Industrial Sites (CAU 553) Task Lead
SNJV Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order Representative
SNJV Quality Assurance Representative
SNJV Analytical Services Chemical Data Validator
SNJV Analytical Services Radiological Data Validator
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B.3.2 Conceptual Site Model
The CSM is used to organize and communicate information about site characteristics.  It reflects the 
best interpretation of available information at any point in time.  The CSM is a primary vehicle for 
communicating assumptions about release mechanisms, potential migration pathways, or specific 
constraints.  It provides a summary of how and where contaminants are expected to move, and what 
impacts movement may have.  It is the basis for assessing how contaminants could reach receptors 
both in the present and future.  The CSM describes the most probable scenario for current conditions 
at each site and defines the assumptions that are the basis for identifying appropriate sampling 
strategy and data collection methods.  Accurate CSMs are important as they serve as the basis for all 
subsequent inputs and decisions throughout the DQO process.
The CSM was developed for CAU 553 using information from the physical setting, potential 
contaminant sources, release information, historical background information, knowledge from similar 
sites, and physical and chemical properties of the potentially affected media and COPCs.  
The CSM represents contamination of the surrounding environment due to migration of contaminants 
that either are currently, or were formerly, present at each of the CASs.  Migration of contaminants to 
areas not presently impacted can occur through infiltration and percolation of contaminants into the 
soil profile, lateral transportation (overland flow) of some contaminants as a result of surface water 
runoff or overflow of accumulated surface water in mud pits, or wind-borne resuspension of 
contaminated surface particles.
SNJV Health and Safety Group Representative
SNJV Environmental Compliance and Waste Management Representative
SNJV Radiation Services Health Physicist
NSTec = National Security Technologies, LLC
NDEP = Nevada Division of Environmental Protection
NNSA/NSO = U.S. Department of Energy, National Security Administration Nevada Site Office
SNJV = Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture
Table B.3-1
Data Quality Objective Meeting Participants for CAU 553 July 27, 2006
 (Page 2 of 2)
Affiliation Department/Project Team Function
UNCONTROLLED when Printed
CAU 553 SAFER Plan
Section:  Appendix B
Revision:  0
Date:  November 2006 
Page B-10 of B-46
The CSM consists of:
• Potential contaminant releases, including media subsequently affected.
• Release mechanisms (the conditions associated with the release).
• Potential contaminant source characteristics, including contaminants suspected to be present. 
• Site characteristics, including physical and meteorological information.
• Migration pathways and transport mechanisms that describe the potential for migration and 
where the contamination may be transported.
• The locations of points of exposure where individuals or populations may come in contact 
with a COC associated with a CAS.
• Routes of exposure. 
If additional elements are identified during the investigation that are outside the scope of this CSM, 
the situation will be reviewed and a recommendation will be made as to how to proceed.  In such 
cases, NDEP and NNSA/NSO will be notified and given the opportunity to comment on and concur 
with the recommendation.  
The applicability of this CSM to the mud pits is summarized in Table B.3-2 and discussed below.  
Table B.3-2 provides information on CSM elements that will be used throughout the remaining steps 
of the DQO process.  Figure B.3-1 represents site conditions applicable to the CSM.        
B.3.2.1 Contaminant Release
The mud spills of CAU 553 are assumed to have similar releases as those identified for the NTS mud 
pits in CAUs 530-535 and CAU 177.  It is unknown whether the spills occurred before or after use in 
the drilling process where diesel and/or radioactivity may have been released.  It can also be 
reasonably assumed the spill material composition is similar (i.e., mud/clay composition and 
properties) regardless if the release was associated with pre- or post-test drilling activities. 
Although the RBCSR eliminated VOCs, SVOCs, PCBs, and metals as COPCs from NTS mud pits 
(based on the conclusion that there is no analytical or process knowledge to suggest these constituents 
are present at significant concentrations in residual mud), it was the most frequently detected 
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contaminant in residual mud.  To be conservative, it was determined that the investigation of 
CAU 553 would evaluate the risk posed by TPH-DRO and verify the closure strategy of no further 
action for CAU 553 mud pits.  Because complete information regarding activities performed at the 
CAU 553 mud spills is not available, VOCs, SVOCs, and radionuclides will also be included as 
COPCs.
The process associated with potential contamination at a mud pit is assumed to be the same process 
that may have contributed to contamination at a mud spill.  The following section will address the 
release of contaminants associated with the drilling mud.  
B.3.2.2 Potential Contaminants
The COPCs for CAU 553 are defined as the analytes reported from the analyses identified in 
Table B.3-2.  The list of COPCs is applicable to Decision I environmental samples from each mud 
spill and is intended to encompass all of the contaminants that could potentially be present.  These 
contaminants were identified during the planning process through the review of site history, process 
Table B.3-2
Analytical Programa
Analysesb All Corrective Action Sites
Organic COPCs
Total Petroleum Hydrocarbons-Diesel-Range Organics X
Semivolatile Organic Compoundsc X
Volatile Organic Compoundsc X
Radionuclide COPCs
Gamma Emitters X
Isotopic Uranium X
Isotopic Plutonium X
Strontium-90 X
aThe COPCs are the analytes reported from the analytical methods listed in Table B.5-1.
bIf the volume of material is limited, prioritization of the analyses will be necessary.
cMay also include Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure analytes if sample is collected for waste management 
purposes. 
COPC = Contaminant of potential concern
X = Required analytical method
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Figure B.3-1
Site Conceptual Model
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knowledge, personal interviews, past investigation efforts (where available), and inferred activities 
associated with the drilling mud processes. 
Target analytes are those contaminants for which evidence and available site and process information 
suggests that they may be reasonably suspected to be present at a given CAS.  The targeted 
contaminants are required to meet a more stringent completeness criteria than other COPCs, thus 
providing greater protection against a decision error.  For this investigation, no targeted analytes have 
been identified. 
B.3.2.3 Contaminant Characteristics
Contaminant characteristics include, but are not limited to solubility, density, and adsorption 
potential.  In general, contaminants with large particle size, low solubility, high affinity for media, 
and/or high density can be expected to be found relatively close to release points.  Contaminants with 
small particle size, high solubility, low affinity for media, and/or low density are found further from 
release points or in low areas where evaporation or ponding will concentrate dissolved contaminants.
The primary source of hydrocarbon contamination is the introduction of diesel as a lubricant during 
the drilling process.  The primary source of potential radiological contamination is the release of 
drilling mud that may have been in contact with radioactive rock and circulated from the borehole to 
the mud pit during post-test drilling.  Process knowledge indicates that bentonite clay is a major 
ingredient in drilling mud (IMANA, 2004).  In general, clay minerals have high porosity, low 
permeability, and the property of expanding several times its original volume when saturated with 
water.  This clay-water mixture has a viscosity several times that of water, making it useful as a 
drilling fluid (DOE/NV 1998a).  Based on the unique properties of bentonite and its prominent 
occurrence in drilling mud, it is believed that its use would help retard the migration of COPCs 
present in the mud.  Furthermore, the residual drilling mud contained within the mud spill is expected 
to act as a barrier to prevent the downward migration of contaminants into underlying native soil.  
The document Evaluation of Potential Hydrocarbon Transport at the UC-4 Emplacement Hole, 
Central Nevada Test Area (DOE/NV, 1998a) reports data that support the conclusion that 
contamination within drilling mud does not migrate significantly based on TPH release experiments. 
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B.3.2.4 Site Characteristics
Site characteristics are the physical, topographical, and meteorological attributes and properties.  
Table B.3-3 lists the physical setting of the CAU 553 CASs.  Listed for each CAS is the number of 
individual spills within the CAS boundary and the approximate dimensions of each spill area.  In 
general, the mud spills are expected to have similar characteristics as NTS mud pits because they 
were all released within the surface soil of the NTS using comparable mud pit processes.       
The locations for a release of drilling mud are directly onto the ground surface.  The media affected 
by a release is typically the surface and shallow subsurface soil; however, due to the binding 
properties of bentonite, contamination is expected to be bound within the mud with no migration to 
the native soil underlying the mud spills.  Contamination, if any, is expected to be evenly dispersed 
and present at relatively uniform concentrations because the mud would have been homogenized as it 
was circulated.  This suggests that surface samples of the residual mud would be representative of the 
mud throughout the depth of the mud spill.  Contamination unrelated to the mud mixing/use process 
may be localized beneath potentially hazardous discarded drilling materials, if present.
Table B.3-3
Physical Setting of CAU 553 Corrective Action Sites 
CAS 19-99-01 19-99-11 20-09-09 20-99-03
Number of Spill Areas 1 3 2 1
Mud Spill Dimensions 1,247 ft2
North (493 ft2)
South (216 ft2)
West (458 ft2)
Each about 
12 x 3 ft 750 x 250 ft
Radiological Postings None
Fence None
Associated Test Chancellor Test1983
Camembert Test
1975 N/A
Darwin Test
1986
Test Release None identified
ft = Foot
ft2= Square foot
N/A = Not applicable
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B.3.2.4.1 Groundwater
Groundwater contamination is not considered a likely scenario at any CAS based on the depth to 
groundwater in Areas 19 and 20.  Data from nearest wells indicate that groundwater levels may range 
from 2,100 to 2,800 ft bgs for Area 19 and 20 CASs (USGS/DOE, 2006a).  Surface migration is not 
expected to be significant because the characteristics of bentonite and/or clay material produce a high 
tension surface in which particles are not easily mobile even when saturated.
B.3.2.4.2 Migration Pathways and Transport Mechanisms
An important element of the CSM is the expected fate and transport of contaminants (i.e., how 
contaminants migrate through media and where they can be expected in the environment).  Fate and 
transport of contaminants are presented in the CSM as the migration pathways and transport 
mechanism that could potentially move the contaminants vertically and laterally throughout the 
various media.  The pathways include air, surface water, and groundwater, and are the routes through 
which possible contamination could migrate from the site(s) to locations where a receptor might 
receive an exposure.  Fate and transport are influenced by physical and chemical characteristics of the 
contaminants and media described in Sections B.3.2.3 and B.3.2.4.  Given the characteristics of both 
the contaminants and the bentonite drilling mud, contaminant migration is expected to be limited.
Infiltration and percolation of precipitation serves as a driving force for the downward vertical 
migration of contaminants through the mud or underlying soil.  The annual potential 
evapotranspiration at the Area 5 Radiological Waste Management Site has been estimated at 62.6 in. 
(Shott et al., 1997), but the precipitation for this region is between 3.5 and 6 in. per year (Winograd 
and Thordarson, 1975).  Therefore, percolation of infiltrated precipitation at the NTS does not 
provide a significant mechanism for vertical migration of contaminants to groundwater 
(DOE/NV, 1992; NNSA/NSO, 2004a).
Lateral migration of contaminants through impacted media is expected to be limited to within the 
physical boundaries of the mud spills due to the binding and high sorption properties of 
clay/bentonite.  Lateral migration may occur as a result of overland flow or erosion and is dependant 
on the percentage of clay/bentonite within the spill matrix.  However, visible observations of the mud 
spill areal extent suggestions lateral migration has been limited over time.
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Releases to the air may result from resuspension of contaminated surface soil particles with wind 
movement.  Wind could potentially suspend surface soil particles and carry them beyond the 
boundaries of the mud spills but only if the hardened, partially cemented bentonite and/or mud is 
physically disturbed.  Overall, airborne migration of contaminants is considered a minor transport 
mechanism for CAU 553. 
B.3.2.5 Exposure Scenarios
Human receptors may be exposed to COPCs through oral ingestion, inhalation, or dermal contact 
(absorption) of drilling mud, soil, or debris due to inadvertent disturbance of these materials, or 
through irradiation by radioactive materials.  The exposure of workers and visitors to site 
contaminants is very dependent upon the activites of the exposed individual at the site.  Based on the 
future land use as identified in the Nevada Test Site Resource Management Plan (DOE/NV, 1998b), 
the areas in which all CAU 553 CASs are located are restricted to industrial uses.
The appropriate exposure scenarios for all CAU 553 CASs is the Occasional Use Area, due to each 
site being in a remote area with no active improvements and the future land use designation is for 
outdoor tests and/or military training exercises.  There is still the possibility, however, that site 
workers could occupy these locations on an occasional and temporary basis such as a military 
exercise (NNSA/NSO, 2006b).  Investigation decisions will be based on the future land-use and 
exposure scenarios for CAU 553 that are provided in Table B.3-4.  
Table B.3-4
Future Land-Use and Exposure Scenarios
Corrective 
Action Sites Future Land-Use Zone Exposure Scenario
All Nuclear and High Explosives Test 
 
This area is designated within the Nuclear 
Test Zone for additional underground 
nuclear weapons tests and outdoor 
high-explosive tests.  This zone includes 
compatible defense and nondefense 
research, development, and testing 
activities
Occasional Use Area 
 
This exposure scenario assumes exposure to industrial 
workers who are not assigned to the area as a regular 
worksite but may occasionally use the site for 
intermittent or short-term activities.   
 
A site worker under this scenario is assumed to be on 
the site for 8 hours per day, 10 days per year, for 
5 years.
Source:  DOE/NV, 1998b; NNSA/NSO, 2006b
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B.4.0 Step 2 - Identify the Goal of the Study
Step 2 of the DQO process states the manner in which environmental data will be used to meet 
objectives and solve the problem; identifies study questions or decision statement(s), and considers 
alternative outcomes or actions that can occur upon answering the question(s).
B.4.1 Decision Statements
The Decision I statement is:  “Is any COPC present in environmental media within a mud spill at a 
concentration exceeding its corresponding action level?”  No further action will be supported if no 
COPCs are identified above corresponding action levels.  For judgmental sampling design, any 
analytical result for a COPC above the FAL will result in that COPC being designated as a COC.  If a 
COC is detected and remediation is feasible, then contaminated media may be removed for disposal 
and additional samples collected (see Figure 1-2).  If a COC is detected and remediation is not 
feasible, then Decision II must be resolved.
The Decision II statement is: “If a COC is present, is sufficient information available to meet closure 
objectives?”  Sufficient information is defined to include:
• Identifying the volume of media containing any COC, as bounded by analytical sample results 
in lateral and vertical directions.
• The information needed to characterize IDW for disposal.
• The information needed to determine potential remediation waste types.
• The information needed to evaluate the feasibility of potential closure options.
If sufficient information is not available to meet closure objectives then site conditions will be 
re-evaluated and additional samples will be collected (as long as the scope of the investigation is not 
exceeded and any CSM assumption has not been shown to be incorrect).
B.4.2 Alternative Actions to the Decisions
In this section, the actions that may be taken to solve the problem statement are identified depending 
on the possible outcomes of the investigation.
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B.4.2.1 Alternative Actions to Decision I
If no COC associated with a release from the CAS is detected, then the mud spill will be closed via 
the no further action alternative.  If a COC associated with a release from the CAS is detected, then 
the extent of COC contamination will be determined and additional information will be required to 
confirm that closure objectives were met.
B.4.2.2 Alternative Actions to Decision II
If sufficient information is available to define the extent of COC contamination, then a closure 
strategy of closure in place with administrative controls will be implemented and further assessment 
of the CAS is not required.  If sufficient information is not available to define the extent of COC 
contamination and confirm that closure objectives were met, then additional samples will be 
collected.
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B.5.0 Step 3 - Identify Information Inputs
This step identifies the information needed, determines sources for information, and identifies 
sampling and analysis methods that will allow reliable comparisons of analytical results with FALs.
B.5.1 Information Needs
To resolve Decision I (determine whether a COC is present at a given CAS), samples need to be 
collected and analyzed following two criteria:  (1) samples must be collected in areas most likely to 
contain a COC (judgmental sampling); and (2) the analytical suite selected must be sufficient to 
identify any COCs present in the samples.  
To resolve Decision II (determine whether sufficient information is available to meet closure 
objectives at each CAS), samples shall be collected and analyzed to meet the following criteria:
• Samples must be collected in areas contiguous to the contamination but where contaminant 
concentrations are below FALs.
• Samples of the waste or environmental media must provide sufficient information to 
characterize the IDW for disposal.
• The analytical suites selected must be sufficient to detect contaminants at concentrations equal 
to or less than their corresponding FALs.
B.5.2 Sources of Information
Information to satisfy Decision I and Decision II will be generated by collecting environmental 
samples using grab sampling, hand augering, or other appropriate sampling methods.  These samples 
will be submitted to analytical laboratories meeting the quality criteria stipulated in the Industrial 
Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002).  Only validated data from analytical laboratories will be used to 
support DQO decisions.  Sample collection and handling activities will follow standard procedures.
B.5.2.1 Sample Locations
Design of the sampling approaches for the CAU 553 CASs must ensure that the data collected are 
sufficient for supporting the selection of a corrective action alternative (EPA, 2002).  To meet this 
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objective, the samples collected from each site should be from locations that either most likely 
contain a COC, if present, or from a location that will accurately confirm the absence of 
contamination within the CAS.  
A judgmental sampling approach will be implemented for all mud spills.  Biasing factors (including 
FSRs) will be used to select the most appropriate samples from a particular location for submittal to 
the analytical laboratory.  Biasing factors to be used for selection of sampling locations are listed in 
Section B.5.2.1.1.  Sample locations may be modified based on site conditions, obvious debris or 
staining of soils, FSRs, or professional judgment if the modified locations meet the DQO decision 
needs and criteria stipulated.  As biasing factors are identified and used for selection of sampling 
locations, they will be recorded in the appropriate field documents.
The implementation of the judgmental sampling approach for CAU 553 is summarized in the 
following section.
B.5.2.1.1 Judgmental Approach for Sample Location Selection 
Decision I sample locations at mud spills will be determined based upon the likelihood of the mud, or 
soil in the case of CAS 20-09-09, containing a COC, if present.  These locations will be selected 
based on field-screening techniques, biasing factors, the CSM, and existing information.  Analytical 
suites for Decision I samples will include all COPCs identified in Table B.3-2.  
Field-screening techniques may be used to select appropriate sampling locations by providing 
semi-quantitative data that can be used to comparatively select samples to be submitted for laboratory 
analyses from several screening locations.  Field screening may also be used for health and safety 
monitoring and to assist in making certain health and safety decisions.  The following field-screening 
methods may be used to select analytical samples at CAU 553:
• Walkover surface area radiological surveys - A vehicle-mounted or handheld radiological 
survey instrument over approximately 100 percent of the CAS boundaries, as permitted by 
terrain and field conditions to detect hot spots of radiological contamination.
• Alpha and beta/gamma radiation - A handheld radiological survey instrument, or equivalent 
instrument or method, may be used at these CASs.
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• Gamma-emitting radionuclides - A handheld dose rate instrument. 
Biasing factors may also be used to select samples to be submitted for laboratory analyses based on 
existing site information and site conditions discovered during the investigation.  The following 
biasing factors will be considered in selecting locations for analytical samples at CAU 553:
• Documented process knowledge on source and location of release.
• Topography:  Topographic lows within the spill area where contaminants could be expected to 
be concentrated.
• Stains:  Any spot or area on the soil surface that may indicate the presence of a potentially 
hazardous liquid release.  Typically, stains indicate an organic liquid such as an oil has 
reached the soil, and may have spread out vertically and horizontally.
• Elevated radiation:  Any location identified during radiological surveys that had 
alpha/beta/gamma levels significantly higher than surrounding background soil.
• Geophysical anomalies:  Any location identified during geophysical surveys that had results 
indicating subsurface materials exist and are not consistent with the natural surroundings or 
process knowledge (e.g., buried concrete or metal, surface metallic objects).
• Drums, containers, equipment or debris:  Materials of interest that may have been used at, or 
added to, a location, and that may have contained or come in contact with hazardous or 
radioactive substances at some point during their use.
• Lithology:  Locations where variations in lithology (soil or rock) indicate that different 
conditions or materials exist.
• Preselected areas based on process knowledge of the site:  Locations for which evidence such 
as historical photographs, experience from previous investigations, or interviewee input exists 
that a release of hazardous or radioactive substances may have occurred.
• Preselected areas based on process knowledge of the contaminant(s):  Locations that may 
reasonably have received contamination, selected on the basis of the chemical and/or physical 
properties of the suspected contaminant(s) in that environmental setting.
• Other biasing factors:  Factors not previously defined for the investigation, but become 
evident once the investigation of the site is under way.
Decision II sample step-out locations will be selected based on the CSM, biasing factors, and existing 
data.  Analytical suites will include those parameters that exceeded FALs (i.e., COCs) in previous 
UNCONTROLLED when Printed
CAU 553 SAFER Plan
Section:  Appendix B
Revision:  0
Date:  November 2006 
Page B-22 of B-46
samples.  Biasing factors to support Decision II sample locations include Decision I biasing factors 
plus available analytical results. 
B.5.2.2 Analytical Methods
Analytical methods are available to provide the data needed to resolve the decision statements.  The 
analytical methods and laboratory requirements (e.g., detection limits, precision, and accuracy) are 
specified in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 of this document.  Table B.5-1 lists the analytes reported by the 
various analytical methods that are considered to be COPCs.    
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Table B.5-1
Analytes Reported by Analytical Methods
VOC SVOC TPH Radionuclides
1,1,1-Trichloroethane 
1,1,1,2-Tetrachloroethane 
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane 
1,1,2-Trichloroethane 
1,1-Dichloroethane 
1,1-Dichloroethene 
cis-1,2-Dichloroethene 
1,2-Dichloroethane 
1,2-Dichloropropane 
1,2,4-Trichlorobenzene 
1,2,4-Trimethylbenzene 
1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane 
1,3,5-Trimethylbenzene 
1,4-Dioxane 
2-Butanone 
2-Chlorotoluene 
2-Hexanone 
4-Methyl-2-pentanone 
Acetone 
Acetonitrile 
Allyl chloride 
Benzene 
Bromodichloromethane 
Bromoform 
Bromomethane 
Carbon disulfide 
Carbon tetrachloride 
Chlorobenzene 
Chloroethane 
Chloroform 
Chloromethane 
Chloroprene 
Dibromochloromethane 
Dichlorodifluoromethane 
Ethyl methacrylate 
Ethylbenzene 
Isobutyl alcohol 
Isopropylbenzene 
m-Dichlorobenzene (1,3) 
Methacrylonitrile 
Methyl methacrylate
Methylene chloride 
N-Butylbenzene 
N-Propylbenzene 
o-Dichlorobenzene (1,2) 
p-Dichlorobenzene (1,4) 
p-isopropyltoluene 
sec-Butylbenzene 
Styrene 
tert-Butylbenzene 
Tetrachloroethene 
Toluene 
Total Xylenes 
Trichloroethene 
Trichlorofluoromethane 
Vinyl acetate 
Vinyl chloride
2,3,4,6-Tetrachlorophenol 
2,4-Dimethylphenol 
2,4-Dinitrotoluene 
2,4,5-Trichlorophenol 
2,4,6-Trichlorophenol 
2-Chlorophenol 
2-Methylnaphthalene 
2-Methylphenol 
2-Nitrophenol 
3-Methylphenolb 
4-Chloroaniline 
4-Methylphenolb 
4-Nitrophenol 
Acenaphthene 
Acenaphthylene 
Aniline 
Anthracene 
Benzo(a)anthracene 
Benzo(a)pyrene 
Benzo(b)fluoranthene 
Benzo(g,h,i)perylene 
Benzo(k)fluoranthene 
Benzoic Acid 
Benzyl Alcohol 
Bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate 
Butyl benzyl phthalate 
Carbazole 
Chrysene 
Dibenzo(a,h)anthracene 
Dibenzofuran 
Diethyl Phthalate 
Dimethyl Phthalate 
Di-n-butyl Phthalate 
Di-n-octyl Phthalate 
Fluoranthene 
Fluorene 
Hexachlorobenzene 
Hexachlorobutadienea 
Hexachloroethane 
Indeno(1,2,3-cd)pyrene 
Naphthalenea 
Nitrobenzene 
N-Nitroso-di-n-propylamine 
Pentachlorophenol 
Phenanthrene 
Phenol 
Pyrene 
Pyridine
TPH 
(Diesel-Range 
Organics)
Plutonium-238 
Plutonium-239/240 
Strontium-90 
Uranium-234 
Uranium-235 
Uranium-238 
 
Other parameters: 
 
Gamma-emitting 
radionuclides
including: 
 
Actinium-228 
Americium-241 
Cesium-137 
Cobalt-60 
Europium-152 
Europium-154 
Europium-155 
Lead-212 
Lead-214 
Niobium-94 
Potassium-40 
Thallium-208 
Thorium-234 
Uranium-235
aMay be reported with VOCs
bMay be reported as 3,4-methylpenol
SVOC = Semivolatile organic compound
TPH = Total petroleum hydrocarbons
VOC = Volatile organic compound
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B.6.0 Step 4 - Define the Boundaries of the Study
Step 4 of the DQO process defines the target population of interest and its relevant spatial boundaries, 
specifies temporal and other practical constraints associated with sample/data collection, and defines 
the sampling units on which decisions or estimates will be made. 
B.6.1 Target Populations of Interest
The population of interest to resolve Decision I (“Is any COC present in environmental media within 
a mud spill?”) is any location within the site that is contaminated with any contaminant above a FAL 
(judgmental sampling).  The populations of interest to resolve Decision II (“If a COC is present, is 
sufficient information available to meet closure objectives?”) are:
• Each one of a set of locations bounding contamination in lateral and vertical directions.
• Investigation-derived waste or environmental media that must be characterized for disposal.
• Potential remediation waste.
• Environmental media where natural attenuation or biodegradation or construction/evaluation 
of barriers is considered.
Regardless of the sampling design, the population of interest for this investigation is surface soil 
(0 to 6 in. depth) defined as the residual drilling fluid within the boundary of a mud spill.  In the case 
of CAS 20-09-09, where the residual drilling fluid is recommended for removal under a best 
management practice, the population of interest is surface soil directly beneath the removed drilling 
mud. 
Following the approved risk-based approach previously used for mud pits, soil samples from the 
surface of the residual drilling fluid are considered sufficient to adequately characterize the risk posed 
by mud pits, and similarly, mud spills.  A review of data from previous mud pit investigations 
conducted under the complex process has demonstrated that TPH-DRO concentrations in surface 
soils are representative of the TPH-DRO concentrations throughout the depth of the residual drilling 
fluid (NNSA/NSO, 2004a).  Although not suspected in the mud spills of CAU 553, the same process 
would apply to radiological constituents within residual drilling fluid.  In addition, considering the 
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proposed industrial future land uses, the surface soil is the primary exposure point for future workers.  
Thus, samples collected from subsurface soils would yield no additional information. 
B.6.2 Spatial Boundaries
Spatial boundaries are the maximum lateral and vertical extent of expected contamination at each 
mud pit, as shown in Table B.6-1.  Contamination found beyond these boundaries may indicate a flaw 
in the CSM and may require re-evaluation of the CSM before the investigation could continue.  Each 
CAS is considered geographically independent and intrusive activities are not intended to extend into 
the boundaries of neighboring CASs.    
B.6.3 Practical Constraints
Investigation of these CASs may be impacted by physical constraints and activities at the NTS.  
General practical constraints include weather, rough terrain, and access restrictions.  Access 
restrictions include scheduling conflicts on the NTS with other entities, areas posted as contamination 
areas requiring appropriate work controls, areas requiring authorized access, and physical barriers 
(e.g., fences). 
Specific constraints that may cause a temporary delay in sampling include potential restricted access 
to Area 19 and 20 CASs during winter months due to snow cover; restricted access to mud spills due 
to ponding of water following inclement weather; and military exercises, which would restrict access 
to Area 19 and 20.
Identified constraints that can limit intrusive sampling include buried debris, underground utilities, 
overhead power lines, and underlying geology (i.e., caliche, bedrock).  Underground utilities surveys 
will be conducted at each CAS before starting investigation activities to determine whether utilities 
exist, and, if so, determining the limit of spatial boundaries for intrusive activities.
Table B.6-1
Spatial Boundaries of CAU 553 Mud Pits and Cellars
Feature Spatial Boundaries
Mud Spills
The lateral boundaries are a 50-foot lateral buffer from the visible 
edges of the mud spills.  The vertical boundary will be a depth of 
10 feet below ground surface.
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B.6.4 Define the Scale of Decision-Making
The scale of decision-making for resolving Decision I and Decision II statements is defined as the 
individual mud spill within each CAS.  This allows for individual mud spills within a CAS to be 
closed independent of one another.  For Decision I, any COC identified in a mud spill will cause the 
determination that the residual mud is contaminated.  Because contamination is expected to be bound 
within the matrix of the drilling mud, further evaluation is not necessary.  
For resolving the Decision II statement, the maximum lateral extent would be defined as the visible 
edges of the mud spill area, and the vertical extent would be the depth of the residual drilling 
mud/grout, because contaminants are expected to be bound within the matrix of the drilling mud. 
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B.7.0 Step 5 - Develop the Analytical Approach
Step 5 of the DQO process specifies appropriate population parameters for making decisions, defines 
action levels, and generates an “If … then …” decision rule that involves the appropriate population 
parameter.
B.7.1 Population Parameters
For judgmental sampling results, the population parameter is the maximum observed concentration of 
each contaminant from each individual analytical sample.  Each sample result will be compared to the 
FALs to determine the appropriate resolution to Decision I and Decision II.  For Decision I, a single 
sample result for any contaminant exceeding a FAL would cause a determination that a COC is 
present within the CAS.  
The Decision II population parameter is an individual analytical result from a bounding sample.  For 
Decision II, a single bounding sample result for any contaminant exceeding a FAL would cause a 
determination that the contamination is not bounded.  
B.7.2 Action Levels
 The PALs presented in this section are to be used for site screening purposes.  They are not 
necessarily intended to be used as cleanup action levels or FALs.  However, they are useful in 
screening out contaminants that are not present in sufficient concentrations to warrant further 
evaluation and, therefore, streamline the consideration of remedial alternatives.  The RBCA process 
used to establish FALs is described in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action 
Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006b).  This process conforms with NAC Section 445A.227, which lists the 
requirements for sites with soil contamination (NAC, 2005).  For the evaluation of corrective actions, 
NAC Section 445A.22705 requires the use of ASTM Method E 1739-95 to “conduct an evaluation of 
the site, based on the risk it poses to public health and the environment, to determine the necessary 
remediation standards (i.e., FALs) or to establish that corrective action is not necessary” 
(ASTM, 1995).
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This RBCA process defines three tiers (or levels) of evaluation involving increasingly sophisticated 
analyses:
• Tier 1 - Sample results from source areas (highest concentrations) are compared to action 
levels based on generic (non-site-specific) conditions (i.e., the PALs established in the 
SAFER).  The FALs may then be established as the Tier 1 action levels, or the FALs may be 
calculated using a Tier 2 evaluation.
• Tier 2 - Conducted by calculating Tier 2 SSTLs using site-specific information as inputs to the 
same or similar methodology used to calculate Tier 1 action levels.  The Tier 2 SSTLs are then 
compared to individual sample results from reasonable points of exposure (as opposed to the 
source areas as is done in Tier 1) on a point-by-point basis.  Total TPH concentrations will not 
be used for risk-based decisions under Tier 2 or Tier 3.  Rather, the individual chemicals of 
concern will be compared to the SSTLs.
• Tier 3 - Conducted by calculating Tier 3 SSTLs on the basis of more sophisticated risk 
analyses using methodologies described in Method E1739-95 that consider site-, pathway-, 
and receptor-specific parameters. 
The comparison of laboratory results to FALs and the evaluation of potential corrective actions will 
be included in the Closure Report.  The FALs will be defined (along with the basis for their 
definition) in the Closure Report.
B.7.2.1 Chemical PALs
Except as noted herein, the chemical PALs are defined as the EPA Region 9 Risk-Based Preliminary 
Remediation Goals (PRGs) for chemical contaminants in industrial soils (EPA, 2004).  For detected 
chemical COPCs without established PRGs, the protocol used by the EPA Region 9 in establishing 
PRGs (or similar) will be used to establish PALs.  If used, this process will be documented in the 
Closure Report.
B.7.2.2 Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon PALs
The PAL for TPH is 100 ppm as listed in NAC 445A.2272 (NAC, 2005). 
B.7.2.3 Radionuclide PALs
The PALs for radiological contaminants are based on the NCRP Report No. 129 recommended 
screening limits for construction, commercial, industrial land-use scenarios (NCRP, 1999) using a 
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25 mrem/yr dose constraint (Murphy, 2004) and the generic guidelines for residual concentration of 
radionuclides in DOE Order 5400.5 (DOE, 1993).  These PALs are based on the construction, 
commercial, and industrial land-use scenario provided in the guidance and are appropriate for the 
NTS based on future land uses presented in Table B.3-4.
Solid media such as concrete and/or structures may pose a potential radiological exposure risk to site 
workers if contaminated.  The radiological PAL for solid media will be defined as the 
unrestricted-release criteria defined in the NV/YMP RadCon Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004b).
B.7.3 Measurement and Analysis Sensitivity
The measurement and analysis methods specified in Sections 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 of this document and in 
the Industrial Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002) are capable of measuring analyte concentrations at or 
below the corresponding FALs for each COPC.  See Section 7.2 for additional details.
B.7.4 Decision Rules
The decision rules applicable to both Decision I and Decision II are:
• If COC contamination is inconsistent with the CSM or extends beyond the spatial boundaries 
identified in Section B.6.2, then work will be suspended and the investigation strategy will be 
reconsidered.  For mud spills that are similar to NTS mud pits, if the characteristic 
concentration of a contaminant exceeds the action level, then the mud spill will be considered 
contaminated and closure alternatives will be evaluated.
The decision rules for Decision I are:
• If the population parameter of any COPC in the Decision I population of interest (defined in 
Step 4) exceeds the corresponding FAL, then that analyte is identified as a COC, and removal 
of the material will be conducted, or Decision II samples will be collected to define the extent 
of COC contamination.  If all COPC concentrations are less than the corresponding action 
levels in mud spills, then the decision will be no further action. 
The decision rules for Decision II are:
• If the population parameter (the maximum observed concentration of any COC) in the 
Decision II population of interest (defined in Step 4) exceeds the corresponding FAL, then 
additional samples will be collected to complete the Decision II evaluation.  If all bounding 
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COC concentrations are less than the corresponding FALs, then the decision will be that the 
extent of contamination has been defined in the corresponding lateral and/or vertical direction. 
• If valid analytical results are available for the waste characterization samples defined in 
Section B.9.0, then the decision will be that sufficient information exists to characterize the 
IDW for disposal, determine potential remediation waste types, and to confirm that closure 
objectives were met.
UNCONTROLLED when Printed
CAU 553 SAFER Plan
Section:  Appendix B
Revision:  0
Date:  November 2006 
Page B-31 of B-46
B.8.0 Step 6 - Specify Performance or Acceptance Criteria
Step 6 of the DQO process defines the decision hypotheses, specifies controls against false rejection 
and false acceptance decision errors, examines consequences of making incorrect decisions from the 
test, and places acceptable limits on the likelihood of making decision errors.
B.8.1 Decision Hypotheses
The baseline condition (i.e., null hypothesis) and alternative condition for Decision I are:
• Baseline condition - A COC is present.
• Alternative condition - A COC is not present.
The baseline condition (i.e., null hypothesis) and alternative condition for Decision II are as follows:
• Baseline condition - The extent of a COC has not been defined.
• Alternative condition - The extent of a COC has been defined.
Decisions and/or criteria have false negative or false positive errors associated with their 
determination.  The impact of these decision errors and the methods that will be used to control these 
errors are discussed in the following subsections.  In general terms, confidence in DQO decisions 
based on judgmental sampling results will be established qualitatively by:
• The development of and concurrence of CSM(s) (based on process knowledge) by 
stakeholder participants during the DQO process.
• Testing the validity of CSM(s) based on investigation results.
• Evaluating the quality of the data based on DQI parameters.
B.8.2 False Negative Decision Error
The false negative decision error would mean deciding that a COC is not present when it actually is 
(Decision I), or deciding that the extent of a COC has been defined when it has not (Decision II).  In 
both cases, the potential consequence is an increased risk to human health and environment.
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B.8.2.1 False Negative Decision Error for Judgmental Sampling
In judgmental sampling, the selection of the number and location of samples is based on knowledge 
of the feature or condition under investigation and on professional judgment (EPA, 2002).  
Judgmental sampling conclusions about the target population depend upon the validity and accuracy 
of professional judgment.
The false negative decision error (where consequences are more severe) for judgmental sampling 
designs is controlled by meeting these criteria:
1. For Decision I, having a high degree of confidence that the judgmental sample locations 
selected will identify COCs if present anywhere within the CAS.  For Decision II, having a 
high degree of confidence that the sample locations selected will identify the extent of COCs.
2. Having a high degree of confidence that analyses conducted will be sufficient to detect any 
COCs present in the samples. 
3. Having a high degree of confidence that the dataset is of sufficient quality and completeness.
To satisfy the first criterion, Decision I samples must be collected from areas most likely to be 
contaminated by COCs (supplemented by random samples where appropriate).  Decision II samples 
must be collected in areas that represent the lateral and vertical extent of contamination (above action 
levels).  The following characteristics must be considered to control decision errors for the first 
criterion:
• Source and location of release
• Chemical nature and fate properties
• Physical transport pathways and properties
• Hydrologic drivers
These characteristics were considered during the development of the CSM and the selection of 
sampling locations.  The field-screening methods and biasing factors listed in Section B.5.2.1.1 will 
be used to further ensure that appropriate sampling locations are selected to meet these criteria.  
Radiological survey instruments and field-screening equipment will be calibrated and checked in 
accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and approved procedures.  The Closure Report will 
present an assessment on the DQI of representativeness (i.e., that samples were collected from those 
locations that best represent the populations of interest as defined in Section B.6.1).
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To satisfy the second criterion, Decision I samples will be analyzed for the chemical and radiological 
parameters listed in Section 4.1.  Decision II samples will be analyzed for those chemical and 
radiological parameters that identified unbounded COCs.  The DQI of sensitivity will be assessed for 
all analytical results to ensure that all sample analyses had measurement sensitivities (detection 
limits) that were less than or equal to the corresponding FALs.  If this criterion is not achieved, the 
affected data will be assessed (for usability and potential impacts on meeting site characterization 
objectives) in the Closure Report.
To satisfy the third criterion, the entire dataset, as well as individual sample results, will be assessed 
against the DQIs of precision, accuracy, comparability, and completeness as defined in the Industrial 
Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002) and in Section 7.2.  The DQIs of precision and accuracy will be used 
to assess overall analytical method performance as well as to assess the need to potentially “flag” 
(qualify) individual analyte results when corresponding QC sample results are not within the 
established control limits for precision and accuracy.  Data qualified as estimated for reasons of 
precision or accuracy may be considered to meet the analyte performance criteria based on an 
assessment of the data.  The DQI of completeness will be assessed to ensure that all data needs 
identified in the DQO have been met.  The DQI of comparability will be assessed to ensure that all 
analytical methods used are equivalent to standard EPA methods so that results will be comparable to 
regulatory action levels that have been established using those procedures.  Strict adherence to 
established procedures and QA/QC protocol protects against false negatives. 
To provide information for the assessment of the DQIs of precision and accuracy, the following QC 
samples will be collected as required by the Industrial Sites QAPP (NNSA/NV, 2002):
• Field duplicates (minimum of 1 per matrix per 20 environmental samples)
• Laboratory QC samples (minimum of 1 per matrix per 20 environmental samples or 1 per 
CAS per matrix, if less than 20 collected)
B.8.3 False Positive Decision Error
The false positive decision error would mean deciding that a COC is present when it is not, or a COC 
is unbounded when it is not, resulting in increased costs for unnecessary sampling and analysis and 
potentially for unnecessary corrective actions. 
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False positive results are typically attributed to laboratory and/or sampling/handling errors that could 
cause cross contamination.  To control against cross contamination, decontamination of sampling 
equipment will be conducted according to established and approved procedures and only clean 
sample containers will be used.  To determine whether a false positive analytical result may have 
occurred, the following QC samples will be collected as required by the Industrial Sites QAPP 
(NNSA/NV, 2002):
• Trip blanks (1 per sample cooler containing VOC environmental samples)
• Equipment rinsate blanks (1 per sampling event for each type of decontamination procedure)
• Source blanks (1 per lot of source material that contacts sampled media)
• Field duplicates (1 per 20 environmental samples or 1 per CAS per matrix, if less than 20)
• Field blanks (1 per 20 environmental samples or 1 per day)
• Laboratory QC samples (1 per 20 environmental samples or 1 per CAS per matrix,  
if less than 20)
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B.9.0 Step 7 - Develop the Plan for Obtaining Data
Step 7 of the DQO process selects and documents a design that will yield data to best achieve 
performance or acceptance criteria.  A judgmental sampling design will be implemented for all 
CAU 553 CASs.  Even in the absence of biasing factors, the sampling planned is considered 
judgmental because of the limited spatial boundaries of each spill.  A summary of the sampling 
approach and data evaluation for each CAS is presented in Table B.9-1.  Section B.9.1 provides the 
specific judgmental sampling approach that will be implemented to select verification sample 
locations and evaluate analytical results at all CASs.    
Because individual sample results rather than an average concentration will be used to compare to 
FALs at the CASs undergoing judgmental sampling, statistical methods to generate site 
characteristics will not be used.  Adequate representativeness of the entire target population may not 
be a requirement to developing a sampling design.  If adequate prior information is available on the 
site of interest, then the sampling may be designed to collect samples only from areas known to have 
the highest concentration levels on the target site.  If the observed concentrations from these samples 
are below the action level, then a decision can be made that the site contains safe levels of the 
contaminant without the samples being truly representative of the entire area (EPA, 2006).
All sample locations will be selected to satisfy the DQI of representativeness in that samples collected 
from selected locations will best represent the populations of interest as defined in Section B.6.1.  To 
meet the DQI criterion for judgmental sampling sites, a biased sampling strategy will be used for 
Decision I to target areas with the highest potential for contamination, if it is present anywhere in the 
Table B.9-1
Summary of Sampling Approach and Data Evaluation for CAU 553
Feature with 
Applicable CASs Description Decision I Parameters Evaluation of Data 
19-99-01
19-99-11
20-09-09
20-99-03
Judgmental Sampling 
Approach
• Initial # of locations:  2 to 4
• Soil profile depth(s):  Surface 
(0-6 in.) at biasing factors 
Point-by-point 
comparison of each 
analytical result to the 
FAL
CAS = Corrective Action Site
FAL = Final action level
in. = Inch
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spill area.  Sample locations will be determined based on process knowledge, previously acquired 
data, or the field screening and biasing factors listed in Section B.5.2.1.1.  If biasing factors are 
present in soils below locations where Decision I samples were removed, additional Decision I soil 
samples will be collected at depth intervals selected by the SS based on biasing factors to a depth 
where the biasing factors are no longer present.  The SS has the discretion to modify the sample 
locations at judgmentally sampled CASs, but only if the modified locations meet the decision needs 
and criteria stipulated in this DQO.   
B.9.1 Mud Spill Sampling Designs
Sufficient historical site knowledge and previous sampling results from similar mud pit/spill 
investigations exist to indicate that the mud spills in CAU 553 can be closed under the no further 
action alternative.  To support this closure alternative, surface verification samples will be collected 
using a judgmental sampling design from each individual mud spill within CAU 553 to confirm that 
COCs are not present at concentrations that pose a risk to human health or the environment.  Samples 
to be collected at mud spills will be obtained using hand scoops, hand auger, or other appropriate 
method.  The following sections outline the judgmental sample design for each CAS and also 
describes any additional activities that may be performed as best management practices.  During the 
investigation for all CASs in CAU 553, the SS has the discretion to modify the sample locations or 
order additional biased samples to be collected, but only if the new locations meet the decision needs 
and criteria stipulated in this DQO.  The SS will use professional judgment to determine whether 
biasing factors (e.g., stains, elevated screening levels) are found during Decision I sampling that 
might indicate the need to take subsurface Decision II samples.  
B.9.1.1 CAS 19-99-01, Mud Spill
The mud spill at this CAS is not contiguous and is located in several areas on and surrounding an 
8-ft-high soil mound.  The thickest concentrations of mud/clay material can be found in localized 
shallow depressions atop the mound and low areas on the ground surface at the base of the mound 
where the mud spilled down the sides.  A minimum of two biased samples will be collected from the 
mound area with the locations biased towards staining, elevated FSRs, and/or the thickest deposits of 
mud assuming any COPCs will be concentrated in these areas.  Debris surrounding the mud spill 
within the CAS boundaries will not be removed or investigated.  Geophysical surveys of the mound 
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indicate no debris is buried and the nature of the mud spill suggests that mud was only deposited on 
the mound surface.  Figure B.9-1 shows the proposed sample locations.
B.9.1.2 CAS 19-99-11, Mud Spill
This CAS has three distinct mud spill areas.  Verification samples will be collected from each spill in 
a location with the highest potential to find contamination if present.  In the absence of staining or 
elevated FSRs, a sample will be collected in either the topographic low within the spill area where 
contaminants could be expected to be concentrated or in the center of the spill if no other biasing 
factors exist.  For the North spill, it is anticipated the grout material will be sampled directly in two 
locations, with at least one location at a yellow-stained area on the north end.  For the West spill, the 
darker gray silt/clay material lying atop the native volcanic material will be sampled.  For the South 
spill, any stained area or the darkest gray coloring of the mud will be sampled.  Figure B.9-2 shows 
the proposed sample locations.
B.9.1.3 CAS 20-09-09, Mud Spill
Due to the location of the two bentonite spills within an DOE Operational Readiness Area, it is 
recommended that both bentonite piles be removed as a best management practice and managed as a 
waste.  Samples will be collected from the material directly for waste management purposes.  A soil 
verification sample will then be collected from beneath each of the removed bentonite piles to 
confirm the absence of COPCs in the underlying soil.  If COCs are shown to be present, then 
Decision II samples will be collected, if deemed necessary.  Figure B.9-3 shows the proposed sample 
locations.        
B.9.1.4 CAS 20-99-03, Mud Spill
The mud spill at this CAS is contiguous and encompasses a large area (750 by 250 ft) where the mud 
is relatively evenly distributed across the site.  This mud spill is the only area of concern for this CAS.  
The pile of steel pellets (based on visual observation of rust) located north of the mud spill does not 
represent an environmental hazard and therefore will not be investigated further.  A radiological 
survey performed on the mud spill indicates no elevated radiological contamination.  Based on these 
data and previous mud pit sampling investigation results, there is no indication that a fuller 
characterization of the spill area is necessary.  Therefore, only four verification samples are 
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Figure B.9-1
Proposed Sample Locations CAS 19-99-01
UNCONTROLLED when Printed
CAU 553 SAFER Plan
Section:  Appendix B
Revision:  0
Date:  November 2006 
Page B-39 of B-46
Figure B.9-2
Proposed Sample Locations CAS 19-99-11
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Figure B.9-3
Proposed Sample Locations CAS 20-09-09
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recommended with one from each quadrant of the spill area.  See Figure B.9-4 for the proposed 
sample locations.  Biasing factors will be identified during a site walkdown and the propose locations 
will be refined based on the site conditions.  It is anticipated that most of the verification samples will 
be collected in pooled, concentrated areas of the mud due to the lack of apparent staining throughout 
the mud spill.    
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Figure B.9-4
Proposed Sample Locations CAS 20-99-03
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C.1.0 Nevada Division of Environmental Protection Comments
The Nevada Division of Environmental Protection has no comments at this time.  Should NDEP 
submit comments at a later date, they will be included in Rev. 1 of this document. 
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